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Using detailed data from rural Pakistan, this paper investigates whether human
capital, learning by doing, gender, and one's status within the family affect the division of
labor within households.  Results suggest the presence of returns to individual
specialization in all farm, nonfarm, and home-based activities.  The intrahousehold
division of labor is influenced by comparative advantage, based on human capital and by
long-lasting returns to learning by doing, but we also find evidence of a separate effect of
gender and family status.  Households seem to operate as hierarchies with sexually
segregated spheres of activity.  The head of household and his or her spouse provide most
of the labor within their respective spheres of influence; other members work less. When
present in the household, daughters-in-law work systematically harder than daughters of
comparable age, build, and education.  Other findings of interest are that there are
increasing returns to scale in most household chores, that larger households work more
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Becker (1965, 1981) was the first economist to formally articulate the role that
comparative advantage and learning by doing may play in the intrahousehold division of
laboring.  In particular, he argued that, if one member of the household must stay at home
to take care of domestic chores, economic efficiency dictates that it should be the one
with the lowest expected wage relative to their productivity in domestic chores (e.g.,
Becker 1981).  This simple but powerful observation has sparked a voluminous empirical
literature, the general conclusion of which is that, indeed, job market participation
responds to the human capital characteristics of individual household members. 
Although most of this literature relates to developed economies, applications to
developing countries yield similar conclusions. 
Non-economic explanations of the intrahousehold division of labor have also been
proposed and can be found in a large body of work written mostly by non-economists. 
These explanations emphasize the role of customs and social norms and argue that
individuals perform the tasks assigned to them by society according to their sex and
status.  The objective of this paper is to test whether social norms, human capital, and
learning by doing can account for the observed division of labor within rural Pakistani
households. 2
 For a review of time allocation studies, mostly in developed countries, see Juster and Stafford (1991).
1
In much empirical work, testing the role of social norms has been hindered by the
fact that data from developed countries are available nearly exclusively for households
with at most one working adult male and female.   Furthermore, the existence of markets
1
for utilities, food preparation, child care, and the like drastically reduce the number of
tasks undertaken by households.  In such small households with few tasks to perform, the
prospect for intrahousehold division of labor is limited.  The situation is quite different in
developing countries where households are large, children actively participate in
productive activities, and households provide much of their own food, fuel, water, and
child care in addition to pursuing a multitude of income-generating activities.  In such
households with multiple tasks and participants, there is sufficient room for specialization
and plenty of scope for social norms to fashion what individuals do.  These households
are also likely to be more organizationally complex.  In contrast to small nuclear
households where the scope for specialization is limited, large households offer more
room for delegation of responsibilities, thereby creating incentive and information
problems similar to those encountered in firms. 
This paper investigates the extent to which human capital, learning by doing, and
socially defined roles affect the division of labor within Pakistani rural households.  We
find that the allocation of tasks is partly determined by comparative advantage
considerations reflected in differences in human capital among household members in
particular; better educated individuals participate more actively in off-farmwork, in line3
with evidence presented in Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1998) for Pakistan.  Results
further indicate that experience in a specific task helps predict what future tasks
individuals perform, controlling for human capital and household composition.  The
effect is strongest in off-farm activities, and weakest in household chores where the
reallocation of tasks among household members is frequent.  Becker (1981) hypothesized
that returns to learning by doing lock individuals in the tasks and roles they have learned
at early stages of life.  Our results indicate that this is, by and large, not true for household
chores in rural Pakistan:  the constant reallocation of these tasks among women suggest
that they are easy to learn; having acquired the necessary skills as young girls is thus
unlikely to be what locks women in household chores later in life.  If lock-in is present, it
is in off-farm activities where males dominate and returns to schooling are high.
We also show that the allocation of tasks is not solely driven by comparative
advantage and learning by doing considerations but also by gender and one's status within
the family—henceforth family status.  In particular, we find overwhelming evidence of a
division of labor by gender after controlling for human capital and task-specific
experience.  Activities are organized into gender-specific spheres of influence:  males are
responsible for "market" work (farming, herding, and other income-generating activities);
females are responsible for home production activities.  These categories correspond
closely to the dichotomy between the "productive" and "reproductive" roles often
assigned to men and women in traditional societies. 4
The gender division of labor is not the only notable characteristic of the data.  We
also find that the allocation of tasks within each gender group varies systematically with
family status after controlling for human capital differences.  Results show that the head
of household and his spouse(s) provide most of the labor to most activities; other
members work less.  This suggests that surveyed households operate as hierarchies with
socially specified roles partly determined by family status.  The observed relationship
between financial control and labor effort is consistent with moral hazard considerations: 
since the head and wife (wives) control household income and are residual claimants,
imperfect enforcement and information asymmetries within the household would induce
them to work harder and assume more responsibilities.  In line with popular perceptions
in Pakistan, we find evidence that daughters-in-law work systematically harder than
daughters of comparable age, build, and education.  In some cases, they work even harder
than the head's wife herself.  These results are consistent with daughters-in-law either
having less bargaining power, or taking a long-term interest in the well-being of the
household where they will spend the rest of their life.
Both theoretical and empirical work on time allocation traces its roots to Becker
(1965), who first formulated a utility-maximizing model of Z goods that were produced
by both time and market goods inputs.  This model has been widely used to analyze
choices of hours worked and later extended by Gronau (1977) and Kooreman and
Kapteyn (1987) to include home production and leisure.  In developed countries,
empirical work has focused on married women's time allocation between market work,5
 Alderman and Christi (1991) control for senior status with a dummy for women aged 50 and above,
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but this variable is not significant.  Sultana, Nazli, and Malik (1994) use district dummies to control for
different societal expectations, but these dummies capture other district effects as well so that their
interpretation is unclear.
home work, and leisure (e.g., Heckman 1974; Gronau 1980).  Because these analyses are
usually conducted based on a sample of married women, the implicit household structure
is nuclear.  In contrast, empirical work on time allocation in developing countries, while
taking the work of Becker and Gronau as a starting point, has had to deal with the
realities of home production and family structure in developing countries (e.g., Evenson
1978). 
One strand of work has examined the choice between household and market-
oriented activities (e.g., Alderman and Chishti 1991; Khandker 1987, 1988; Skoufias
1993).  These choices have been shown to depend on the woman's age, her education,
household demographic composition, family wealth, and distance to schools, town, or
market center.  Another issue that has dominated the literature on time allocation in South
Asia is the extent to which social norms, particularly patriarchy and the norm of female
seclusion or purdah, dominate economic factors that affect time allocation (Khandker
1988; Alderman and Chisti 1991; Sultana, Nazli, and Malik 1994).  This literature,
however, is not fully conclusive because the authors lack sufficiently detailed data and
convincing instruments for social roles.   Sathar and Desai's (1996) work on Pakistan
2
explores interactions between gender, age, and class hierarchies in determining women's
and men's time allocation.  Using dummy variables to capture possible hierarchies6
associated with different family structures, they show that women living in nuclear
families participate more intensively in economic and household work, possibly because
the absence of economies of size hinders the division of labor.  Controlling for family
unobservables via conditional logit, they find that daughters-in-law are the least likely to
be employed in productive or market-oriented activities, especially within a family
enterprise.  In contrast, men's overall labor force participation is largely unaffected by
their position in the family hierarchy.
In this paper, we propose and test an alternative methodology to investigate
whether human capital, learning by doing, and socially defined roles affect the division of
labor inside the household.  Our results largely confirm previous work but considerably
refine our understanding of the factors influencing intrahousehold task allocation.  We
begin in Section 2 by sketching our conceptual framework and testing strategy.  The data
are presented in Section 3, together with descriptive statistics.  Test results are discussed
in Sections 4 and 5.  The framework is extended in Section 6 to discuss dynamic effects
and returns to learning by doing.  Conclusions are presented at the end.
2.  THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Becker (1965) was one of the first economists to argue that, in the presence of
returns to specialization, it is optimal for households to divide tasks among their
members.  To the extent that tasks require different levels of human capital—e.g.,7
 Gains from coordination arising from information processing and transmission costs are formalized
3
and discussed, for instance, in Itoh (1991).
strength, experience, literacy—household members should be allocated to those tasks for
which they have a comparative advantage.  Returns to specialization can result from
learning by doing, in which case it is optimal for household members to learn and
permanently specialize in certain tasks (e.g., Becker 1981).  They may also be purely
static and result, for instance, from better coordination of effort (e.g., cooking is easier to
organize if one person takes care of it instead of five)  and from easier monitoring (e.g.,
3
giving each household member the full responsibility of one or more tasks makes it easier
to identify whether each has done their share of total household work).  Clear delineation
of responsibilities offers the added advantage of reducing the inevitable wrangling about
who in the household is not pulling their weight, hence reducing tension.
Whether returns from specialization are static or dynamic has an effect on the
division of labor over time:  if specialization is motivated by the desire to capitalize on
task specific experience, one should observe that household members perform the same
tasks over time.  In contrast, if tasks are easy to learn but returns to specialization arise
from coordination and monitoring consideration, we would expect individuals to switch
from one task to another over time, if only to break out of the monotony of routine.
As the above examples suggest, returns to specialization need not depend on
differences in human capital or experience.  Many tasks are simple enough that they can
be performed by anyone with minimal tutoring.  In this case, the matching of individuals8
 Some would argue that they also represent an instrument of power and domination (e.g., Folbre 1984).
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with particular tasks becomes arbitrary, although some matching is required to achieve
returns from specialization.  This arbitrariness complicates intrahousehold bargaining.  To
the extent that bargaining is costly and generates friction, society may seek to simplify the
allocation process by proposing an ideal division of labor that achieves (most of) the
gains from specialization while satisfying some socially acceptable criteria of
intrahousehold equity.  These norms—which we call social roles—typically organize the
intrahousehold division of labor around gender, age, and family status.  They may be
entirely arbitrary, or seek to match tasks with average group characteristics, such as
physiological differences in body size and reproductive functions.   If socially defined
4
roles affect the division of labor among otherwise identical individuals, then labor shares
will be influenced by the role composition of the household in ways that are not
accounted for by differences in human capital and work experience.  Testing this idea is
the main objective of this paper. 
It is also conceivable that intrahousehold division of labor is solely motivated by a
desire to follow social norms, not by an effort to capture gains from specialization.  For
instance, it could be that Pakistani women do all the cooking and cleaning simply because
tradition says so.  If this were the case, there is no reason why we should observe
individual specialization by task:  since working together is presumably more fun than
working alone, women would be expected to cook and clean jointly.  A world in which
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 The model could easily be extended to a collective model by replacing the household's welfare
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function with a bargaining function.  In this case, factors affecting the bargaining power of individual members
would enter the labor allocation function.  Unfortunately, the data do not provide convincing instruments for
intrahousehold bargaining power.
(1)
team work within each socially defined role.  In contrast, a world in which gains from
specialization are present (and returns to and preference for teamwork are weak) would
display individual division of labor within social roles.  Patterns of labor sharing within
each social category thus provide evidence of the relative returns to specialization and
team work.  We use this insight to investigate whether returns to specialization—as
opposed to purely arbitrary social roles—are the driving force behind intrahousehold
division of labor.
Formally, the decision problem of the household can be represented as an optimal
allocation problem.  Let C  and C  be vectors of market and home produced goods, m    z
respectively, and let T  and L  denote the total time endowment and total labor of
 i     i
individual i.  Market goods are those for which a market exists; home goods must be
produced by the household.  Household welfare can be written: 
where V  is the utility of individual i defined over consumption and leisure and ù  stands
 i                           i
for welfare weights.  We treat these weights as exogenously given, which is formally




























 For simplicity of exposition, we ignore hired-in labor.  Given the very small proportion of hired-in
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labor in the survey area and the evidence that the labor market is not perfect (e.g., Fafchamps and Quisumbing
1998), this assumption is adequate for our purpose.
(2)
(3)
and home goods are consumed individually, in which case   and
others are household public goods, in which case   and
The household has at its disposal a series of partially intertwined production
activities, some of which yield marketable output X , others yield home goods C .  To m           z
allow for the possibility of economies of scope, the production technology of the
household is written: 
where L  denotes a vector of effective labor allocated to various tasks a, and K  denotes a
 *
a                          k
vector of semi-fixed inputs.  Wage work is subsumed into function G(.) as a distinct
activity.  Effective labor is given by
6
where H is a vector of human capital characteristics of individual i and e (.) is a function i                        a
that determines labor effectiveness in task a.  Since, by definition, market goods can be
exchanged at a given market price, the household faces a cash budget constraint:  j
m
pm(Cm – Xm) ’ U ,
L
i





 To the extent that markets are missing for certain domestic services and utilities—or that households
7
choose not to participate because of transactions costs, separability between production and consumption
decisions breaks down (e.g., Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986; de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991).
(4)
(5)
where U represents unearned income.  Maximizing household welfare (1) subject to
equations (2) to (4) plus a series of nonnegativity constraints,  yields a series of
reduced-form labor allocation functions:
7
Comparative advantage dictates that individuals with the highest labor effectiveness in
activity a fully specialize in that activity. (e.g., Becker 1981, chapter 2).  The role of
comparative advantage in the intrahousehold division of labor can thus be investigated by
verifying whether the relative human capital and prior experience of household members
determine what task they perform.  Whether social roles matter can be similarly analyzed
by testing whether factors known to shape social roles, such as gender and family status,






















 It is theoretically possible to estimate equation (5) separately for each household structure, but in
8
practice one quickly runs out of degrees of freedom.
(6)
Estimating equation (5) directly is difficult when households differ dramatically in
their composition and structure, as is the case in rural Pakistan.   To make estimation
8
manageable, we rewrite (5) as   where   denotes total labor and
stands for individual labor shares.  Only certain factors affect labor shares
, such as social roles and differences in human capital and task-specific experience. 
For instance, the household ownership of land and livestock is expected to affect total
labor use in cultivation and herding, but not which household member participates in
these activities. It is thus possible to investigate the intrahousehold division of labor by
estimating the determinants of total labor L  and individual labor shares   separately.  a
This is the approach adopted here.
By summing equation (5) over all household members, total labor use can be
written as
This equation can be econometrically estimated across households of different sizes and
composition by replacing individual specific variables H and ù with household summary i    i
statistics, such as household size, the average human capital of household members, and
family background variables potentially affecting welfare weights.  To the extent that
social roles constitute binding constraints on household optimization, total labor useN1 % j
J
j’2







 The validity of this test rests critically on the hypothesis that household composition does not
9
influence labor use for reasons other than social norms.  If various household groups have divergent utility
rankings, differences in preferences will be reflected in labor choices.  To the extent that variations in utility
rankings are systematic across groups, they will be captured by household composition variables.
 For instance, if men are absolutely prohibited to cook, a household without female members could
10
not feed itself.  This example indicates that strict adherence to social norms is likely to influence household
formation, an issue that is beyond the scope of this paper.
 Equation (12) makes use of the fact that 1 + x . e  when x is small.  See Fafchamps and Quisumbing
11                          x
(1998) for a similar application.
(7)
depends on the role composition of the household.  One way to test whether social norms
about the division of labor are constraining—and have an efficiency cost—is thus to test
whether the role composition of the household affects total labor use.   If social norms
9
were followed very strictly, their efficiency cost could be potentially very large.   On the
10
other hand, if there were many different tasks to be performed and households were large
and diverse, social norms are unlikely to be constraining and the efficiency cost would be
negligible. 
A convenient parameterization for family composition is obtained by noting that 
where J is the number of categories, N is the number of household members in category j, j
N is total household size, and á is a parameter that expresses how different category j is j
from the omitted category, category 1 :  if household members are equivalent in terms of
11
labor supply and consumption demand, all the á's are 0.  A –1 # á < 0 means that j              j




adding a member of category j does not raise the household total.  Household
composition effects can thus be tested using á estimates. j
Thanks to this parameterization, it is also possible to ascertain whether there are
increasing returns to household size in the provision of certain home goods.  Increasing
returns to size may arise (within a certain range) either because the consumption of
certain goods is nonrival—e.g., a kitchen—or because their production is subject to
increasing returns to scale—e.g., meal preparation.  Whenever returns to size are present
in, say, task a, the labor allocated to that task should increase less than proportionally
with household size.  This is important because it has been argued that one of the reasons
why households are formed is precisely to take advantage of returns to size. 
Equation (7) ignores valuable information on individual labor shares and cannot be
used to test for gender and status effects when they are not constraining.  To overcome
these limitations, an analysis of the determinants of individual labor shares is needed.
Theory suggests that labor shares, denoted  , vary with (1) an individual's human capital
relative to other household members; (2) task-specific skills acquired from past
experience; and (3) the status of the individual relative to the gender and family
composition of the household.  The first two effects correspond to Becker's idea of
comparative advantage; the last effect controls for what the noneconomic literature has
described as social roles, that is, determinants of task allocation based purely on gender
and family status.  They can be tested by regressing individual labor shares on human15
 As always, the validity of this test depends on the absence of omitted variable bias:  if role variables
12
are correlated with an omitted variable influencing labor use, they will show up as falsely significant.  These
issues are discussed in detail in latter sections. 
capital differences, measures of past experience, and family composition.  Details of the
estimation method are presented in Section 5. 
To summarize, we shall estimate two complementary sets of regressions, one on
aggregate household labor per task, and one on labor shares per task.  In the first set of
regressions, the unit of observation is the household; in the second set, the unit of
observation is an individual within the household.  In the first set, household labor is
regressed on semi-fixed factors; unearned income; human capital; and the family status
and age-sex composition of the household.  If human capital partly determines what
people do, human capital variables should be jointly significant.  Family status variables
should be significant only if socially defined roles are constraining.   The presence of
12
increasing returns to size can be tested by verifying whether the elasticity of labor with
respect to N is significantly smaller than one.
The share regressions are used to test whether gender and family status affect the
intrahousehold allocation of labor separately from human capital differences.  In
particular, we examine whether the head of household and his wife (wives) take on a
disproportionate share of all labor, an outcome that would suggest the presence of
information and enforcement problems within the household.  Finally, we investigate
whether particular activities are characterized by either returns to specialization or returns
to team work by examining the proportion of households that fully specialize.  16
 As a consequence of questionnaire design, farm supervision is not clearly distinguished from farm
13
labor itself:  respondents were essentially asked how many days since the last visit they inspected their farm.
The questionnaire treats fractions of a day as a full day.
3.  THE DATA
The data on which our analysis is based come from 12 rounds of a household
survey conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in four
districts of Pakistan between July 1986 and September 1989 (see Nag-Chowdhury 1991
for details).  A panel of close to 1,000 randomly selected households in 44 randomly
selected villages were interviewed at 3 to 4 months intervals on a variety of issues
ranging from incomes, agricultural activities, and labor choices to anthropometrics,
education, land, and livestock (see Adams and He 1995; Alderman and Garcia 1993). 
Responses to these questions were combined by the authors to generate a consistent data
set containing annual information about household composition, income, assets, inherited
land, human capital, and time allocation to various activities.  All asset variables refer to
the beginning of the year. 
This data set is unusual in having four separate sources with which to analyze time
allocated to various activities:  (1) a recall of total labor, both family and hired, devoted to
crops (by task), livestock, construction, and farm supervision for the kharif and rabi
seasons on the family farm, as well as wage labor on others' farms ; (2) a nonfarm
13
activity survey recalling each member's primary and secondary nonfarm activities in the
previous week; (3) a one-week recall of up to 15 different household chores; and (4) a17
 Not to antagonize male respondents, questions about domestic chores that are exclusively female
14
were asked only to women.  No questions were asked about children aged 6 or less.  
comprehensive, though less disaggregated, one-week recall on activities performed in the
morning and afternoon, also including leisure.  These questions were asked for all
members present in the household other than small children.   These data are available
14
for each household member, together with information on gender, age, schooling, height,
and relation to the household head.  Total farm labor recall was asked in all rounds; the
nonfarm activity survey and the comprehensive one-week recall were conducted in years
two and three.  Questions about female time allocation to household chores were asked in
the three survey years but questions about male participation in these chores were asked
only in year three. 
The basic characteristics of the surveyed households are presented in Table 1.  The
median household size is 8 people, half of which are adults.  Each year is divided into
two distinct cropping seasons, kharif and rabi, which differ in terms of rainfall and
cropping patterns.  The main crop during the drier rabi season, from mid-October to
mid-April, is wheat, whereas the main crop during kharif, from mid-April to
mid-October, is rice.  Sources of income are quite varied.  Crops account for about one-
fourth of average income; livestock accounts for another 15 percent.  Nonfarm earned
income—a mix of wages and self-employment income from crafts, trade, and
services—represents 30 percent of average income; rental income and remittances
amount to another 30 percent.  Agricultural wage income is negligible among sample18
See Strauss and Thomas (1995) for a comprehensive review of attempts to account for various
15
dimensions of human capital in measuring labor markets, health, and nutrition outcomes.
Years of schooling also influence achievement as measured in test scores, e.g., Glewwe and Jacoby
16
(1994).  The impact of test scores on rural labor market outcomes in Pakistan has been investigated by
Alderman (1996).  Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1998) use Raven's test scores in addition to schooling to
control for innate ability.  They show that Raven's test scores have little influence on labor allocation.  Since
Raven's test scores are missing for many individuals, we do not use them here.  We also do not use the math
and reading scores collected in the survey because of the very small number of valid observations.
households.  As already noted by Alderman and Garcia (1993) and by Adams and He
(1995), livestock and nonfarm income are more equally distributed than crop income,
rental income, or remittances.  On average, households own 8 acres of land, half of which
is either canal or well irrigated.  The median is much smaller, however, indicating that
land is unequally distributed.  The data also show large differences among households in
inherited land and in the amount of land owned by the father of the head.  These two
variables, in addition to the education of the father and mother of the household head, are
used throughout as proxies for family background. 
Human capital variables are summarized in Table 2.  They include experience
proxied by age and age squared; education measured in years of schooling, and childhood
nutrition measured by height.   As a measure of experience, we use age and age squared
15
rather than years of post-schooling wage work because, unlike in Alderman (1996), rates
of school attendance are extremely low among older adult males and among adult
females.  Age and age squared are also more appropriate to capture life-cycle effects. 
Years of schooling is a measure of formal investment in human capital.   Height proxies
1619
 Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1998) also used body mass index (BMI) as a measure of human capital.
17
Because BMI is sensitive to work effort, it is likely to be correlated with time allocation, especially with the
choice between more or less strenuous activities.  To avoid potential endogeneity bias, we refrain from using
BMI as a regressor.
for health and nutrition aspects of human capital.   Height, when evaluated for adults,
17
captures the cumulative effects of childhood and adolescent nutrition as well as genetic
endowment.  Unlike BMI, it is not subject to short-term fluctuations.  While we use
height of non-adults, we also include age as a regressor to control for the upward trend in
height due to growth.  Table 2 shows that the average household head has spent 2.8 years
in school; the median is zero.  Female members of the household have a much lower level
of education than males.  Forty percent of males have no education versus 86 percent for
females.  The sample population has a short stature.
We use two variables to capture social roles:  (1) gender (male or female) and
(2) family status, based on the relationship to the household head.  Among males, we
distinguish between the household head, sons, and other males; among females, we
identify the wife, daughters, daughters-in-law, and other females.  Children less than 7 are
not distinguished by gender; unlike their elder siblings, they do not work.  It is likely that
seniority is also associated with a greater importance within the family, but given our
data, the effect of age on social status cannot be distinguished from that of experience. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics on the average time spent in various activities,
and the share contributed by males and females, respectively.  Household tasks, leisure,20
 We borrow the expression from Brown and Haddad (1995).
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and "market" work  (an aggregate of work on own farm, work on others' farms, and non-
18
farmwork) are the three main activities that occupy households' time.  Males account for
the dominant share of time spent in market work and leisure, while women have the
major share of household tasks.  These features are similar to those observed in
developed economies, though they are more pronounced.  Within each gender grouping,
there appear to be strong differences across categories (Table 4a).  Husbands account for
the largest share of all market activity (around 55 percent of total male time), but they
tend to devote more time to work on their own farm.  Husbands and sons devote around
the same proportion of male time to non-farmwork and household tasks (around 40
percent each for each category).  Wives also account for the bulk of female time in market
activity (50 percent) and perform 40 percent of household tasks and marketing. 
Daughters account for a larger share of market activity (around 25 percent) than
daughters-in-law (10 to 13 percent).  These figures, however, do not control for
household composition and differences in human capital.
The data on household chores show even sharper differences across gender and
categories.  Females are almost completely responsible for fetching water and making
dung cakes; males do most of the firewood collection, marketing, herding, fodder
collection, and hunting (Table 3).  Females account for almost 60 percent of time spent
milking, the task which is least segregated by gender.  As mentioned above, males were
not asked about a whole set of activities that were asked only of females, so the female21
share is, by default, 100 percent.  Among males, husbands spend the most time fetching
wood and water, milking, hunting, and collecting fodder; sons spend a larger amount of
time herding and making dung cakes—possibly more routine, less desirable activities
(Table 4b).  Among females, wives do most of the chores, and account for more than half
the female share of marketing, milking, collecting fodder, and meal preparation.  In the
first two activities—marketing and milking, they may be residual claimants of the
proceeds. 
While there is evidence of very strong differences across categories, it is unclear
whether these differences result from differences in human capital (comparative
advantage), social roles (arbitrary specialization), or hierarchies (information and
enforcement considerations in the household firm).  Tables 3 and 4 also do not control for
differences in household composition; as discussed in Section 2, they may be misleading
indicators of relative labor shares.  To sort out these various factors, a multivariate
approach is required, to which we now turn.
4. TOTAL LABOR USE
We begin by examining the total time allocation of surveyed households.  Table 5
presents tobit regressions of time allocated to farmwork, non-farmwork, household tasks,
leisure, and two aggregates, farmwork, and market work, in January (rabi season) and
September (kharif season).  The regressors include the number of people in various22
age-sex categories (wife is the omitted category), their average human capital, stocks of
land and livestock, unearned income, and family background variables potentially
affecting welfare weights.  Following the discussion above, we test whether household
members are equivalent in terms of labor supply and consumption demand, or are all á's  j
0.  In the rabi season (January), this is decisively rejected for non-farmwork, household
tasks and marketing, leisure, and market work as a whole; in the kharif season
(September), this is rejected only for household tasks.  The husband and other males
contribute more than wives to non-farmwork, market work, and leisure in the rabi season;
sons and other males contribute significantly less to household tasks in both seasons.
Households with fewer educated adult males spend more time in farmwork, whether on
the family farm or others'; households with higher average male education spend more
time in non-farmwork (e.g., Fafchamps and Quisumbing 1998).  Households with taller
males are associated with more time in household activities, but less time in leisure.  The
reverse is true for females: households with taller females appear to spend more time in
leisure, but leisure consumption is higher in households with younger females.
Even after controlling for human capital, gender and family status affect the total
amount of time spent in non-farmwork, market work, and leisure.  We reject the
hypothesis that all females are the same in non-farmwork, leisure (in rabi), and market
work, but, contrary to expectations, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the presence
of daughters or daughters-in-law has the same effect on total labor allocation, except in
non-farmwork.  The coefficient on husbands, sons, and other males, á, is also j23
 This feature is somewhat reminiscent of the Second World War in the U.S., during which time
19
women joined the labor market, only to withdraw once the war was over.
significantly different from -1 in all categories except household tasks in the rabi season;
these differences are significant only for leisure, farmwork, and market work for sons and
other males during kharif.  This indicates that adding more adult males and sons does
increase the household total in these categories.  Gender differences are important in all
broadly-defined categories (except farmwork) in the rabi season; these differences are
less important in the kharif season, probably because it is the main cropping season and
segregation by gender is more costly.  
19
Table 6 presents tobit regressions of the total time household members spend on
household chores.  For activities where both males and females participate, we restrict the
analysis to year 3 since data on male time spent on chores were collected only in that
year.  For exclusively female tasks, we pool the three years of data.  Regressors are
unchanged.  The coefficient on household size is an estimate of returns to scale in
household chores: if it is larger than one, households must increase their labor more than
proportionally with more members; if it is smaller than one, households benefit from
increasing returns to scale; if the coefficient is zero, the labor required to perform a
certain chore is a fixed cost independent of household size.  Results show that household
chores as a whole benefit from increasing returns:  the coefficient of household size is
0.21 and significantly different from 0.  For many chores, the estimated coefficient is
small and nonsignificant.  This is particularly true for fetching water, collecting firewood,24
 Detailed regressions on particular agricultural tasks were also estimated but are omitted for the sake
20
of brevity. 
and visiting the market; these activities appear to represent fixed household costs.
Cooking, washing clothes, and cleaning the house increase with household size, but at a
less than proportional rate.  Only herding time appears to increase faster than household
size. 
Next, we test whether household members are equivalent in terms of contribution
to household chores; this is rejected for total home time, fetching water, marketing,
collecting fodder, and knitting (the test is whether all á's are 0).  Households with j
better-educated adult males spend less time in total home chores, fetching wood and
water, and herding, but spend more time in marketing.  Households where adult females
are better educated reduce total time in home production and fodder collection. 
Controlling for human capital, gender and family status appear to be important in
determining the total time the household spends fetching water, marketing, fodder
collection, knitting, milking, and making ghee.  Coefficients for all females are not
significantly different from each other except in marketing, making ghee, knitting, and
collecting fodder.  Gender differences are significant only in fetching wood, marketing,
collecting fodder, and knitting. 
Finally, we conduct a similar analysis on time spent on market-oriented activities
such as crops, livestock, and various categories of non-farmwork.  Results are presented
in Table 7.   The hypothesis that gender and family status do not matter is rejected for
2025
 Since daughters-in-law, as a rule, stay around the home, it must be that their presence enables other
21
females to work off-farm; see Katz (1995) for a similar argument in Guatemala.
work on one's farm and that of others, and for non-farmwork, especially government
employment.  In the latter case, the presence of other adult males and daughters-in-law in
the household dramatically raises time allocated to government work, suggesting that the
government employees captured in the surveys tend to be adult dependents, male or
female.   As discussed in Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1998), households with better
21
educated males spend less time in farming and livestock activities and more time in non-
farmwork—particularly government employment and self-employment.  They are also
less likely to work as farm or nonfarm casual workers.  The education of the father of the
head has an identical effect, suggesting that the effect of schooling on the propensity to
engage in certain activities carries over across generations.  Other regressors in general
have the expected sign and often are significant:  households with more livestock farm
more and work less off-farm, households with more unearned income work less in
everything, etc. 
Taken together, the results indicate that the gender and family status composition of
the household has a pervasive influence on the total time the household devotes to
various activities, even after controlling for differences in human capital, assets, unearned
income, and family background.  This suggests that something other than human capital
determines who does what and that social roles or hierarchical considerations are binding26
 Total work is computed as the sum of farm, livestock, and nonfarm work and household chores.
22
Time spent on household chores is converted into man-days per year by assuming a 6-hour day and 52 weeks
per year. 
in the sense that households with a different mix of gender and family status act
differently.
5.  INTRAHOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION OF TASKS
 
To further investigate these issues, we now examine the forces that shape who does
what within the household.  The extent to which gains from specialization are present in a
particular activity can be gauged by examining the distribution of labor shares.  Figure 1
shows a frequency distribution of the share of total work performed by individual
household members.   In terms of total work, the extent of complete specialization is
22
low:  less than 2 percent of the surveyed individuals perform all the work in their
household; less than 8 percent of individuals aged 7 and above do no work at all.
Conditional on incomplete specialization, shares follow a skewed, single-peaked
distribution, suggesting quite a bit of variation in relative workload across individuals. 
As could be expected, average work shares decrease with household size:  individuals in
larger households perform a smaller share of total work. 
While it is true that most household members participate in the total workload of
the household, they do not necessarily participate in all the activities undertaken by the
household.  Figure 2, for instance, shows the distribution of individual shares of time27
 For this statement to be exact, the maximum likelihood estimator of the variance must be used, i.e.,
23
the sample variance should be multiplied by (T-1)/T, where T is the number of observations. 
spent fetching water.  The figure indicates that close to two-thirds of individuals do not
fetch water, while a significant proportion fetch all the water for their household.  Only a
small proportion of all labor shares fall somewhere in between.  A similar pattern can be
observed for most activities, including aggregate categories such as total non-farmwork or
household chores.
To summarize the extent of specialization in all tasks, we construct two indices. 
The first one, which we call the index of complete specialization, is defined as the
proportion of all households in which an activity is undertaken by a single individual:  the
higher the proportion, the stronger the gains from specialization.  We also compute a
second, more general, measure that incorporates unequal distribution of workload in the
case of incomplete specialization.  It is constructed using the variance of labor shares.  If
every household member participated equally in a particular task, the variance of labor
shares would be 0.  On the other hand, if full specialization were universal, the variance
of labor shares would be (N  – 1)/(N ) .  An index of specialization that is invariant to
r    r 2
household size can thus be constructed by multiplying the sample variance by
(N ) /(N  – 1):  a value of 1 means complete specialization for all households; a value of 0
r 2 r
means equal sharing in all households.   Table 8 summarizes the extent of task
23
specialization using these two indices.  Results are dramatic:  except for aggregate
































 To make this clear, suppose that half the households have a wife; in these households the wife's share
24
of food preparation is 1.  The other half of the households have a wife and a daughter-in-law.  Wives' share
is then 1/3 while that of daughters-in-law is 2/3: daughters-in-law thus work harder than wives.  Yet, over the
entire sample, wives' average share is 4/6 while that of daughters-in-law is 2/6: regressing shares on dummies
does not correct for household composition and leads to incorrect inference as to whether daughters-in-law
work harder than wives. 
 In case equation (8) yields a negative number (number greater than 1),   takes the value 0 (1).
25
(8)
single household member in most households.  Incomplete specialization indices further
confirm that task specialization is the rule. 
From Tables 3 and 4, we suspect that gender and social roles affect who does what
in the household, but we do not know whether observed differences in average workload
are due to human capital, household composition by gender and family status, or a
combination thereof.  To disentangle these effects, we now conduct a multivariate
analysis that controls for both household composition and human capital.  Simply
regressing   on human capital and family composition would fail to yield meaningful
results when family structure is extremely varied and complex, as is the case in the data
we analyze.   To get out of this quandary, we develop a representation for labor shares
24
that controls for household composition but is parsimonious in parameters.  We write the








































 This term can be seen as an approximation to an exponential formulation in which the expected labor
26
share is equal to  , using the fact that exp (x) . 1 + x for x small.
(9)
The two parts of equation (8) correspond to human capital and household composition
effects, respectively.  The human capital term is
where â  is a parameter and   denotes the difference between the human capital h of ah
member i and that of other household members.   If a human capital characteristic h does
26
not affect the allocation of tasks across household members, then â  is zero.  Note that ah
the correct regressor is the difference between individual i's human capital and that of
other household members:  if all members have the same human capital, it should not
influence the allocation of tasks across members.
The household composition term is
where N  is the number of household members in the r category, n  / N /N is the share of r                      r    r
category r in household labor force, R is the number of categories, and   is a
parameter that represents category r's involvement in activity a.  Functional form (9) has










household composition has no effect on the allocation of tasks:  work is shared equally
and expected shares are equal to 1/N.  This is true irrespective of the values of the ã
parameters.  Second, expression (9) is decreasing in household size:  other things being
equal, individuals in larger households undertake, on average, a smaller share of the total
household labor allocated to any task.  These two properties are highly desirable since, by
construction, they are always exactly satisfied for average shares within each household.
Expression (9) is also easy to interpret.  As illustrated in Figure 3, when the ã's are
equal to 1, the second term in expression (9) boils down to N /N:  the expected share of r
household work falling upon the shoulders of a particular group r is equal to the share of
the household workforce that this group represents.  Thus, for instance, if males and
females have a ã of one in food preparation, then the average share of cooking time
performed by all males together will be equal to the share of males in the household labor
force.  Next, if we normalize the ã's to sum to S, a value of ã greater than 1 for category r
implies that members of that category perform less work than members of other groups
(Figure 3).  By the same token, a low value of   implies that group r provides more than
its share of household workforce to the labor required for activity a (Figure 3).  Finally,
the ã's indicate the order in which tasks are assigned to roles:  those with the smallest 
are the most likely to undertake activity a; if they are absent from the household, those
with the next smallest   undertake it, etc. 
Expression (9) yields easy tests of household composition effects.  Since equal
sharing requires that all ã's equal 1, household composition effects can be tested byS
i




















 We actually did estimate equation (10) by nonlinear least squares.  The results we obtained are
27
qualitatively very similar to those reported below.
 By analogy with the linear probability model. 
28
 Experimentation with tobit formulations confirmed these fears.  For instance, regressing shares on
29
1/N using a two-limit tobit customarily yields coefficients superior to unity—e.g., 3 or 4—even though, by
construction, the average share is exactly one for each household.  In contrast, OLS regression always yields
a coefficient of one with infinite precision. 
(10)
examining whether all ã's are jointly equal to 1.  By extension, if   for r ￿ s, this
implies that, when present, the two groups r and s contribute equally to task a.  One can
thus examine whether family status influences labor allocation by testing whether
different status categories have different ã parameters. 
Having identified a suitable functional form for  , we now turn to the distribution
of actual shares   around their expected value.  One possibility would be to assume that
and to estimate equation (10) via nonlinear least squares (NLS).   Actual shares,
27
however, are bound to remain between 0 and 1.  Thus, although NLS estimates might be
consistent,  reported standard errors would be biased, given that normality assumptions
28
are violated.  A tempting alternative would be to postulate the existence of a latent share
and to estimate equation (10) using a (nonlinear) two-limit tobit estimator.  Tobit,
however, is known to be sensitive to the normality assumption (e.g., Greene 1997; Powell
1984; Honore and Powell 1994), which is likely to be violated for  .
29ƒ(S*0<S<1) ’ Ã(a%b)
Ã(a)Ã(b)



























 Experimentation with a nonlinear two-limit tobit estimator revealed that the normality assumption
30
is highly problematic, especially in tasks for which complete specialization is frequent.
     (11)
We therefore adopt an alternative approach and postulate a distribution for   as
follows.  We begin by assuming that, with some probability p , complete specialization a
arises for task a in the sense that a single household member provides all the labor
required for that task.  In this case,   follows a binomial 0-1 distribution with mean  . 
Incomplete specialization obtains with probability 1–p , in which case   takes a value a
strictly between 0 and 1.  We assume that   then follows a Beta distribution with mean
, i.e. that (dropping subscripts and superscripts for improved readability)
where Ã(.) is the usual Gamma function, parameter  , and b is a variance-like
parameter.  The likelihood function for parameters p, b, ã, and â immediately follows
from the above assumptions regarding the shape of   and the distribution of   around
its conditional mean.  Maximum likelihood estimates are computed by maximizing this
function with respect to the parameters to be estimated.
This unusual formulation offers several advantages.  First, unlike a two-limit tobit
model, it does not require normality of a latent share variable.   Second, the Beta
30
distribution is sufficiently flexible to accommodate skewed distributions such as the ones
displayed in Figures 1 and 2.  Finally, and most importantly, our formulation yields a













 Without this normalization, ã parameters are only identified by the curvature of the relationship
31
between household composition and specialization.  This complication is unnecessary and adds nothing to
interpretation.
 Since, by construction, shares sum to one over each household.
32
(12)
parameter can be interpreted as an indication of the relative strength of returns to
specialization and returns to teamwork irrespective of human capital or social role effects
since these effects are already controlled for via  .  In the estimation, we let p  vary with a
household size to allow for systematic differences in specialization.  We expect that
larger households find it easier to let their members specialize in a few tasks for which
they become fully responsible.  This is the pin factory parable of Adam Smith applied to
the household:  family size must be large enough to allow division of labor. 
Results for farm and nonfarm work and for some of the household chores are
presented in Table 9.  Results for exclusively male and exclusively female activities are
shown in Tables 10 and 11, respectively.  Table 12 contains results from the one-week
total recall interviews.  To facilitate interpretation, the   parameters are normalized to
sum to the number of categories r participating in task a.   One observation per
31
household is omitted to avoid correlation in the  's across observations.   To minimize
32
numerical difficulties, estimation is organized so that it yields the â parameters in levels,
and b and the ã's in logs.  The corresponding ã's in level are reported at the bottom of the
Tables.  The dependence of p on household size is given the form34
 For most tasks, potential participants include all male and female members aged 7 and above.  For
33
exclusively female tasks, N is restricted to females aged 7 and above only.  Similarly for exclusively male tasks.
where N is the number of potential household participants for the task being studied.  
33
We also report the value of p at the sample median of eight participating household
members and at half the median.  A series of tests of gender and social role effects are
included in the tables.  Parameter estimates and test results are, in general, highly
significant.  
As is clear from all the tables, results confirm the extent of full specialization:  the
estimated probability of complete specialization p in general oscillates between 50 and 90
percent.  Results also indicate that, except in a few cases, the extent of specialization
increases with household size:  the larger the household, the more likely it is to delegate
the entire responsibility for a particular task to a single household member.  This is
consistent with the division of labor increasing with "firm", i.e., household size. 
Participation in household chores as a whole is the only noticeable exception, with a
probability of complete specialization of only 13 percent, decreasing with household size.
Results indicate that, as predicted by Becker (1981), human capital plays a
significant role in determining who does what, as demonstrated by the high joint
significance of the human capital variables in all regressions.  In agreement with evidence
presented in Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1998) and with the tobit regressions reported in
Section 4, we find that individuals who are better educated are more likely to be the ones
who work off-farm, particularly as self-employed, and are less likely to tend the livestock,35
 Joint utility maximization equates the marginal utility of leisure of each individual with their marginal
34
return to labor.  If the latter rises with education, leisure consumption must go down as long as welfare weights
are equal and utility is not a function of education directly. 
 Their inclusion is justified by the fact that their participation in total work is nonnegligible.
35
to work as casual workers, and to perform household chores—except visit the market. 
This is true also for activities that are exclusively male or female.  Females members who
have more schooling thus have a strong tendency to perform fewer household chores even
though their participation in non-farmwork remains minimal in rural Pakistan. 
Schooling also raises leisure time, an outcome that is incompatible with equal
welfare weights for all.  Indeed, if all household members were weighted equally in the
household's welfare function, members with a higher productivity should work harder and
be compensated with more consumption.   The fact that this is not the case suggests that
34
education is correlated with higher welfare weights.  An alternative explanation is that
educated household members are more involved in social activities such as information
gathering and community building that have returns for the household but are not
regarded as work in this predominantly rural environment.  This issue deserves more
investigation. 
That age and height influence participation in most activities is hardly a surprise,
given that individuals from age 7 and above are included in the regression.   We find that
35
taller and older individuals are more likely to work on market-related activities such as
farm and nonfarm activities.  Age is significant in most other regressions as well.  Older
household members focus on activities that require travel outside the household, such as36
collecting fodder and firewood or visiting the market.  Activities reserved for younger
household members are essentially home-based chores such as cooking and washing
dishes, washing and ironing clothes, cleaning the house, and knitting and stitching.  This
is consistent with the idea that households seek to protect children, since children who
wander around on their own either get into mischief or into trouble.  Older household
members also consume more leisure.  Graphical analysis (not shown) further indicates
that the reduction in work effort with age is gradual and steady; we find no evidence of a
set "retirement age" threshold beyond which participation drops rapidly.  Height also
affects which household chores members specialize in, but it has either no effect (Table
9) or a negative effect (Table 12) on participation in chores in general.  Shorter household
members focus on fetching water and cleaning the house while taller members focus on
milking animals, gathering fodder and firewood, and preparing ghee.  Shorter
members—mostly children—also enjoy more leisure, a result consistent with the fact that
they are probably less productive. 
Human capital alone (or at least, the components of human capital that we were
able to measure) cannot, however, fully account for differences in work shares.  There
exist systematic differences that can be explained by differences in gender or family
status.  Pairwise comparisons of individual coefficients for husband and wife, sons and
daughters, and other males and females are highly significant in most regressions,
suggesting that gender is a major determinant of work allocation.  In fact, for several of
the activities for which we have data, gender differences are so strong that we observe no37
or virtually no involvement by the other sex, irrespective of household composition. 
Results are consistent with widely publicized and fairly common patterns:  males focus
on market-oriented work such as farming, livestock production, and non-farmwork.  They
also are responsible for collecting firewood and visiting the market.  The only activities
for which gender specialization is less significant (though still significant for some
categories) are farm casual work, milking animals, gathering fodder, and, for the "other"
males and females category only, nonfarm self-employment.  We also observe large
gender differences in leisure consumption, with all male categories consuming more
leisure than females.
Gender is not the only determinant of task allocation, however.  Family status also
matters, indicating that social roles vary not only with gender but also with status in the
household.  Several strong regularities emerge from the tables.  They are most easily seen
by observing the parameter estimates themselves, and are confirmed by formal tests (see
tables).  First, husband and wife assume a major responsibility in most activities even
after controlling for household composition.  Second, household members who are not
the head or his wife, their sons and daughters, or their daughters-in-law, participate less in
all household activities.  Third, daughters work less hard than daughters-in-law.  In fact,
daughters-in-law work harder on domestic chores and enjoy less leisure than the wife of
the head herself.  It is only in crop work, non-farmwork, and certain specific chores that
wives work harder than daughters-in-law.  Results further suggest that daughters-in-law
are discouraged from participating in activities that involve either traveling outside the38
 There were only a handful of polygamous households in the sample so that the effect of a polygamy
36
structure on labor allocation could not be studied.
 This is not automatic: in three of the surveyed households, the head is female although a husband or
37
other adult male is present.
household (e.g., crop work, herding, collecting firewood, carrying meals to workers in the
field), earning an independent income (e.g., ghee preparation), or both (e.g., non-
farmwork, visiting the market). 
Taken together, these results suggest that rural Pakistani households operate like
firms. They have a hierarchical structure with a husband and wife couple at the top.
36
From the fact that the husband is more involved in market-oriented activities and
therefore has better control over household finances, we speculate that he is the head of
the household enterprise, a conclusion that is reinforced by the fact that, whenever a
husband and a wife are present, the husband is identified to enumerators as the head of
household.  Husband and wife each have a separate sphere of authority and influence,
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however.  Husbands look after "market-" oriented work such as crops, livestock, and non-
farmwork.  They occasionally enlist the help of female household members but, whenever
male members are present they take on the bulk of market work.  Wives are responsible
for most household chores, with the exception of collecting firewood and visiting the
market.  Within each sphere of influence—or "division" of the household firm—exists a
hierarchical structure whereby subordinate family members fall under the supervision and
management of the husband and wife.  This hierarchical arrangement suffers from the
usual moral hazard problems.  As a result, husbands and wives end up taking on more39
tasks and working harder than all other household members. This is made clear in Table
13 which shows total days worked and the number of activities in which various
household members are involved, either as sole participant or in collaboration with
others.
The degree of involvement in household activities appears to be related to the stake
a particular household member has in the prosperity of the household and with the claim
this member is likely to have on household consumption.  Husband and wife, for
instance, are typically residual claimants of the household income.  The fact that they
work harder than their children and other male and female dependents constitutes indirect
evidence that they are unable to motivate these dependents to work as hard as they do. 
Drawing inspiration from Becker (1981), Jones (1983, 1986) and Udry (1996),
Fafchamps (1998) suggests commitment failure as one possible explanation for such a
state of affairs, i.e., that husband and wife are unable to credibly commit to reward their
dependents for the work they have done.  If enforcement of intrahousehold contracts is
imperfect, delegation of tasks is incomplete and work gets concentrated in the hands of
residual claimants—the head and wife.  It is interesting to note that household members
who are likely to exit the household, such as sons and daughters, participate less
intensively, especially as they get older.  This is because their commitment to the
household is weakest—what, in developed economies, we would call the "teenager
syndrome."  In contrast, daughters-in-law work extremely hard, often at par if not harder
than the wife herself—and certainly harder than daughters of similar age, education, and40
 Since exit is not a viable option for any of the female members of the household, threat points must
38
be interpreted in the sense of a dysfunctional household in which individuals spend the income they control
(e.g., Lundberg and Pollack 1993).  In this context, responsibility for market-oriented tasks is a determinant
of bargaining power.
build.  One possible interpretation is that daughters-in-law are in the household for the
long haul and have a stake in its long term prosperity—more stake, in fact, than
mothers-in-laws who are older and, therefore, likely to "exit" earlier.  An alternative and
often advocated interpretation is that daughters-in-law have little bargaining power in
their new household and are exploited by their mothers-in-law.  The fact that
daughters-in-law are less likely to undertake market activities and to work outside the
home provides circumstantial evidence supporting the bargaining power interpretation: 
their threat point is lower, which may explain why they work harder.   Other possibilities
38
are that daughters are being pampered for the marriage market, or that they are given a
break by their affectionate parents before becoming exploited daughters-in-law in another
household.
6.  SPECIALIZATION AND LEARNING BY DOING 
So far we have shown that the allocation of work within rural Pakistani households
is influenced both by human capital differences and by gender and family status.  In this
section, we investigate whether this specialization results from learning by doing.  Becker
(1981) argues that intrahousehold specialization can be seen as an effort to capture returns
to learning by doing.41
 Only those activities for which data were collected in two or more subsequent years are reported. 
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He goes on to demonstrate that, if learning by doing is the reason for
intrahousehold specialization, individual household members should undertake the same
activities repeatedly over time, i.e., they get locked into a particular role.  To the extent
that skills specific to certain tasks are acquired during childhood, people may even be
"programmed" into particular tasks from a very young age.  This process may help
reproduce gender casting across generations.
Whether intrahousehold specialization results from learning by doing can be tested
by verifying whether the allocation of tasks across household members changes over time
or not.  If specialization is driven by returns to learning by doing, people should do more
or less the same thing each year.  Table 14 shows the percentage of household members
switching in and out of activities from one year to the next.   At first glance, individuals
39
appear to perform the same tasks repeatedly over time, consistent with the learning by
doing hypothesis.  This is especially true for market-oriented (e.g., nonfarm employment)
and farm management activities (e.g., farm supervision and field repairs).  Still, there is a
substantial proportion of individuals who switch tasks from year to year, especially in
household chores.
The raw frequencies reported in Table 14 must, however, be interpreted with
caution because they do not correct for household composition effects.  Clearly, if
cooking is performed by women and a household has a single working age female, this
woman will cook; there will be no switch.  This hardly constitutes evidence of learning byE[St–1] ’ ñSt–1 % (1–ñ)¯ S ,
¯ S
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 Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.  We also estimated an ordinary least
40
squares version of equation (13).  Results confirm that, once we control for human capital and gender/family
status (in the OLS case, via dummy variables), the estimated ñ parameter drops dramatically.
(13)
doing.  A more detailed analysis is thus called for.  To do so, we expand the model
presented in Section 5 to account for possible lagged effects of intrahousehold allocation. 
Dropping activity and individual-specific subscripts to improve readability, we posit that
conditional expected labor shares at time t can be written as 
where   is, as before, given by equation (8) in Section 3.  The distribution of S around its t
conditional expectation is as before.  Estimation results for ñ are presented in the last
column of Table 14.   They all test significantly different from both 0 and 1 with very
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high levels of confidence.  Except for certain nonfarm activities (government and private-
sector employment, plus self-employment), estimated values of ñ are all below one-half. 
They are particularly small for household chores and for specific crop-related tasks. 
Other qualitative results are essentially unchanged—except that some precision is lost due
to smaller sample size.
Taken together, these results indicate that once we control for household
composition and differences in human capital, having undertaken a particular task in the
past has a significant but relatively minor effect on the probability of performing that
same task again in the future.  The ease with which individuals switch tasks constitutes
evidence that returns to learning by doing are not large, especially in simple chores such43
as making dung cakes and cleaning the house.  Although there may be returns to learning
by doing in certain market-oriented tasks, learning by doing is unlikely to be the reason
for the very high levels of intrahousehold specialization observed in the data.  To put it
differently, if there are returns to learning by doing in the many different tasks performed
by rural Pakistani households, they are acquired sufficiently rapidly not to have a lasting
impact on the intrahousehold allocation of tasks.  We can therefore rule out the idea that
individuals get locked into narrowly defined patterns of activity as a result of their
upbringing. The rationale for intrahousehold specialization must thus be sought
elsewhere, either in returns to learning by doing that are very rapid to acquire, or in static
returns to specialization having to do with the organization of tasks and the delegation of
responsibility.  The only exception is non-farmwork, where returns to experience appear
higher and where women are penalized by their low level of schooling (e.g., Sawada
1998).
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
Using detailed data from rural Pakistan, this paper has investigated whether human
capital, learning by doing, and socially defined roles affect the division of labor within
households.  Results concerning human capital confirm what we already knew: 
households with better educated members are more involved in non-farmwork (e.g.,
Fafchamps and Quisumbing 1998).  They also indicate that better educated household44
members work less on crops, livestock, and household chores and that they enjoy more
leisure.  This is true for both males and females, hence suggesting that schooling raises
intrahousehold bargaining power and one's implicit welfare weight.  Other dimensions of
human capital such as age, a proxy for experience, and height, a proxy for past nutritional
status, have the expected effect on intrahousehold allocation, with taller and older
members taking on chores that are more physically demanding and require traveling
outside the household. 
After controlling for individual-specific human capital, we found overwhelming
evidence of division of labor by gender and family status.  Males are responsible for
"market" work (farming, herding, and other income-generating activities); females, for
home production activities.  This pattern is not peculiar to rural Pakistan and has been
observed in many other societies as well (e.g., Cleave 1974; Brown and Haddad 1995). 
In addition, the allocation of tasks within each gender group varies systematically with
family status.  The head of household and his or her spouse provide most of the labor to
most activities; other adult members of the household work less.  Similar results are
reported by Fafchamps (1985a, 1985b, 1986a, 1986b).  In agreement with popular
perceptions in Pakistan, we also found that daughters-in-law work systematically harder
than daughters of comparable age, build, and education. 
Taken together, these results indicate that the allocation of tasks within households
is not solely driven by comparative advantage considerations.  Rather, households seem
to operate as hierarchies with socially specified roles partially determined by gender and45
family status.  The observed correlation between financial control and labor effort is
consistent with moral hazard considerations, long-term commitment to the household,
and internal bargaining power:  individuals with more control over household finances
and with a long-term stake in the household work harder.  Finally, we found some
evidence of long-lasting returns to learning by doing in nonfarm activities and farm
management, but not in household chores.  We can therefore rule out the idea that women
get locked into these chores because they learned them as little girls.  If lock-in is present,
it is in off-farm activities where males dominate and returns to schooling are high.
Throughout our analysis we have regarded household composition as given and we
have sought to understand the intrahousehold allocation of tasks conditional upon its
gender and family structure.  The evidence we collected suggests that household
composition affects what individuals do and how hard they work.  To the extent that
households form to maximize the gains from being together, our findings suggest that two
fundamental forces shape household formation:  gains from specialization, which favor
larger households, and incentive issues, which penalize them (Becker 1981).  If gains
from specialization are large, households should, on average, be larger.  This seems to be
the case in our study area:  the wide variety of tasks that Pakistani rural households
undertake leaves much room for a precise division of labor, which also helps mitigate
monitoring and shirking problems.  In addition, large households benefit from returns to
scale in household chores and can more easily let some members fully specialize in
off-farmwork.  What appears to keep household size in check are problems of shirking46
and monitoring, with the household head and his wife working harder than other
members except daughters-in-law.  In this respect, one cannot but notice the formal
similarity between rural Pakistani households and firms:  both solve internal organization
problems via a complex hierarchical structure.
What remains unclear from this work is how households are formed over time.  For
instance, do individuals with a nonfarm occupation join already existing households?  Or
do larger households let some of their members specialize is less subsistence-oriented
activities such as non-farmwork?  These issues deserve more research.47
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Table 1—Sample Summary Statistics
Number of  Sample Standard
observations Mean Median deviation
Household composition
Total household size 2,509 8.7 8 4.3
Adult males (20-65) 2,509 2.0 2 1.2
Adult females (20-65) 2,509 1.8 1 1.1
Young (6-20) 2,509 3.1 3 2.3
Children (0-5) 2,509 1.6 1 1.6
Old (>65) 2,509 0.3 0 0.6
Income (in 1986 rupees)
Total income 2,202 29,457 20,584 34,635
a
Net crop income 2,202 7,355 2,138 21,420
Net livestock income 2,202 4,566 3,643 6,176
Wages from agricultural work 2,202 287 0 1,210
Non-farm earned income 2,202 8,823 6,036 10,067
Rental income 2,202 3,876 0 14,879
Remittances and transfers 2,202 4,573 0 17,427
b
Assets
Total land owned in acres 2,526 8.4 2.0 18.4
c
Irrigated land owned in acres 2,526 3.8 0.0 9.7
Rainfed land owned in acres 2,526 2.9 0.0 10.2
Total land owned by father in acres 2,526 11.7 0.5 29.8
Inherited land in acres 2,526 5.1 0.0 15.5
Value of farm tools and equipment in rupees 2,526 9,054 1,011 27,359
Number of cattle 2,526 2.0 1 2.7
Number of buffalos 2,526 1.8 0 2.6
Number of bullocks 2,526 0.3 0 0.8
Number of donkeys 2,526 0.2 0 0.7
Number of sheep and goats 2,526 2.9 2 4.9
Labor in days
Kharif family labor 2,526 70 27 106
Rabi family labor 2,526 46 20 68
Kharif hired labor 2,526 7 0 38
Rabi hired labor 2,526 7 0 26
Herding labor 2,526 135 36 250
Agricultural wage labor 2,526 0 0 7
Nonfarm labor 2,526 214 141 265
 Water tax is deducted from total income.
a
 96 percent of received tranfers are remittances.
b
 Difference between total land and irrigated and rainfed land is noncultivable land—mostly pastures.
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Table 2—Human capital summary statistics
Number of  Sample Standard
observations Mean Median deviation
Husband and wife
Age of head 2,436 48.2 47.0 13.7
Years of education of head 2,436 2.8 0.0 4.1
Height of head 2,395 167.3 168.0 6.5
Age of wife 2,242 41.5 40.0 12.1
a
Years of education of wife 2,242 0.3 0.0 1.5
a
Height of wife 2,014 152.4 152.0 6.5
a
Household averages
Average age of adult males 2,497 38.0 37.0 8.6
Average years of education of adult males 2,497 3.7 2.5 3.9
Average height of adult males 2,426 167.4 167.5 6.1
Average age of adult females 2,493 37.1 36.0 8.2
Average years of education of adult females 2,493 0.6 0.0 1.6
Average height of adult females 2,322 152.4 152.0 6.2
 In polygamous households, average over all wives.
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Table 3—Time allocation, by gender
Male Female
Number of households Average  share share




Work on own farm 890 0.48 93 7
Work on others' farm 117 0.06 76 24
Work on own or others farm 926 0.54 91 9
Non-farm work 1,035 0.65 94 6
Farm and nonfarm work 1,434 1.19 93 7
Home tasks/marketing 1,611 2.74 16 84
Leisure 1,548 1.71 81 19
B. September interview
Work on own farm 634 .035 73 27
Work on others' farm 27 .001 21 79
Work on own or others farm 654 0.36 71 29
Nonfarm work 645 0.42 91 9
Farm and nonfarm work 1,000 0.78 79 21
Home tasks/marketing 1,556 2.38 10 90
Leisure 1,128 1.12 76 24
C. Household chores
Fetching water 438 5.0 7 93
Firewood collection 468 5.0 76 24
Visiting the market 575 5.9 89 11
Herding 246 11.0 88 12
Milking 513 3.3 43 57
Collecting fodder 539 12.8 60 40
Hunting 12 0.2 92 8
Making dung cakes 387 1.5 1 99
Meal preparation 125 0.9 0 100
Husking 43 0.5 0 100
Cooking 748 24.4 0 100
Knitting and sewing 303 2.6 0 100
Making ghee 320 1.7 0 100
Washing and ironing clothes 741 6.10  0 100
Cleaning the house 726 6.3 0 100
For general data from the January and September interviews, average is expressed in days during the
a
week preceding the interview. Two years of data are combined. For household chores, the average is the
total hours per household during the week preceding the interview. For household chores, only year 3 is
used because it is the only year with both male and female data.52
Table 4a—Social roles and time allocation in general
Share of total time spent on different
                             activities by various family categories                             
Household 
Own Other's  Own and Farm and tasks/




Husband 59 52 58 47 54 47 34
Son 29 31 30 40 35 40 49
Other males 12 17 12 13 11 13 17
Number of observations 871 93 903 1,001 1,422 1,215 1,508
September interview
Husband 63 42 63 42 53 46 36
Son 26 8 26 44 35 41 49
Other males 11 50 11 13 11 13 15
Number of observations 521 6 524 614 867 766 960
Females
January interview
Wife 59 45 54 45 50 41 28
Daughter 19 38 23 31 27 27 36
Daughter-in-law 10 6 9 12 11 17 7
Other females 14 11 14 12 13 15 30
Number of observations 109 32 137 107 232 1,599 721
September interview
Wife 49 57 49 51 50 42 30
Daughter 23 14 22 29 24 25 29
Daughter-in-law 14 15 14 11 13 17 10
Other females 14 15 15 9 13 15 30
Number of observations 224 22 245 97 324 1,548 47553
Table 4b—Social roles and the allocation of tasks
     Share of total time spent on household chores by various family categories    
Fetching Collecting Collecting
water wood Marketing Herding Milking fodder
(percent)
Males
Husband 55 57 72 33 67 58
Son 33 32 21 45 23 30
Other males 12 11 7 22 9 12




Wife 41 42 57 41 62 51 49
Daughter 30 33 15 34 12 17 21
Daughter-in-law 19 11 8 10 16 18 20
Other females 11 14 19 14 10 14 10
Number of observations 420 163 125 35 347 284 385
Carry meals Making
to workers Husking Cooking Knitting ghee Washing Cleaning
Wife 52 48 47 39 64 45 37
Daughter 20 12 20 26 10 23 31
Daughter-in-law 14 31 23 23 13 23 20
Other females 14 8 9 12 13 10 12
Number of observations 125 43 746 302 319 739 7245
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Table 5—Tobit regression on total household time devoted to all activities
Dependent variable is the total time devoted to particular activities by all household members, based on a one-
week recall interview (measured in half-days per week)
                                                            January interview                                                                                                                     September interview                                                              
Work on own farm Off-farm work Farm and off-farm Home activities Leisure and rest Work on own farm Off-farm work Farm and off-farm Home activities Leisure and rest
b
Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t-
efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic
Household composition
1n(household size) 0.20 2.44 0.59 6.76 0.47 7.71 0.69 17.33 0.77 13.93 0.52 2.15 0.38 3.12 0.36 4.71 0.57 11.82 0.47 5.94
a
Share male head –0.18 –0.25 2.29 3.04 1.46 2.74 –0.51 –1.47 1.35 2.81 –1.24 –0.55 –0.21 –0.18 0.04 0.07 –0.32 –0.76 –0.14 –0.20
Share sons 0.19 0.51 0.57 1.44 0.71 2.57 –0.97 –5.41 0.51 2.08 0.60 0.58 –0.14 –0.22 0.24 0.69 –0.91 –4.21 0.32 0.89
Share other males –0.10 –0.28 1.00 2.72 0.79 3.06 –1.05 –6.31 0.28 1.23 0.56 0.57 0.15 0.26 0.37 1.12 –0.84 –4.14 0.23 0.68
Share daughters –0.28 –0.77 0.05 0.12 0.26 0.95 –0.02 –0.09 –0.16 –0.63 0.33 0.31 –0.58 –0.91 –0.35 –0.98 0.30 1.39 0.17 0.46
Share daughters-in-law –0.23 –0.64 0.69 1.81 0.57 2.11 –0.20 –1.15 –0.45 –1.86 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.69 0.09 0.25 0.06 0.29 0.13 0.38
Share other females –0.30 –0.87 –0.12 –0.34 –0.00 –0.00 –0.20 –1.23 0.11 0.48 –0.54 –0.51 –0.87 –1.49 –0.56 –1.72 –0.02 –0.11 0.21 0.64
Share children –0.35 –1.01 –0.04 –0.10 0.04 0.16 –1.30 –7.97 –0.40 –1.76 –0.72 –0.73 –0.32 –0.56 –0.30 –0.94 –1.02 –5.18 –0.37 –1.13
Share young males 0.02 0.06 0.40 1.11 0.39 1.56 –1.08 –6.65 0.90 4.01 0.10 0.11 –0.22 –0.38 0.00 0.01 –0.90 –4.61 0.83 2.53
Share young females –0.39 –1.14 –0.07 –0.18 –0.04 –0.17 –0.20 –1.21 –0.02 –0.07 0.20 0.20 –0.61 –1.08 –0.48 –1.49 0.27 1.36 0.33 1.00
Human capital
Males
Average age –0.00 –0.27 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.33 –0.01 –1.67 –0.00 –0.59 –0.03 –1.48 0.01 0.86 0.00 0.21 –0.01 –1.86 –0.01 –1.68
Average squared age 0.00 0.18 –0.00 –0.78 –0.00 –0.56 0.00 1.78 0.00 1.19 0.00 0.84 –0.00 –0.81 –0.00 –0.52 0.00 1.71 0.00 1.54
Average education –0.01 –2.02 0.01 1.80 –0.00 –1.23 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.82 –0.05 –3.22 0.02 2.13 –0.01 –1.20 0.00 0.31 –0.00 –0.20
Average height 0.00 0.27 –0.00 –0.20 0.00 0.95 0.00 1.86 –0.00 –2.46 0.01 1.14 –0.00 –0.20 –0.00 –0.82 0.00 1.22 –0.00 –0.23
Females
Average age 0.00 0.09 –0.01 –1.06 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.20 –0.02 –2.99 –0.01 –0.50 0.01 0.51 0.00 0.19 –0.00 –0.11 –0.02 –2.20
Average squared age –0.00 –0.33 0.00 1.14 –0.00 –0.25 –0.00 –1.65 0.00 3.32 0.00 0.67 –0.00 –0.30 0.00 0.03 –0.00 –0.16 0.00 2.80
Average education –0.02 –1.55 –0.01 –0.78 –0.02 –2.13 –0.00 –0.67 0.00 0.39 –0.00 –0.07 0.00 0.04 –0.01 –1.20 –0.01 –1.40 0.02 1.53
Average height –0.00 –0.35 –0.00 –0.18 –0.00 –0.81 –0.00 –1.20 0.01 3.52 0.01 1.24 –0.00 –0.56 0.01 1.95 –0.00 –0.08 0.00 0.51
Assets
ln(owned land) –0.03 –1.56 0.02 0.80 –0.01 –0.88 –0.01 –0.69 0.03 2.05 0.04 0.68 0.01 0.35 –0.01 –0.40 –0.01 –0.69 0.03 1.75
Share irrigated 0.18 3.88 –0.15 –2.98 –0.05 –1.57 0.04 1.96 –0.04 –1.30 0.10 0.78 –0.14 –1.92 0.01 0.26 –0.02 –0.74 –0.05 –1.03
ln(value of  farm tools) 0.05 4.58 0.01 0.66 0.02 3.31 –0.01 –1.38 –0.01 –1.15 0.01 0.35 –0.01 –0.74 0.01 0.95 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.65
ln(number livestock) 0.22 9.51 –0.14 –5.69 0.02 1.22 0.,03 2.59 0.02 1.58 0.12 1.79 –0.03 –0.97 0.07 3.32 0.03 2.39 –0.03 –1.40
Share buffalo 0.02 0.33 –0.02 –0.44 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.56 0.02 0.48 –0.06 –0.38 0.02 0.18 –0.01 –0.11 –0.01 –0.22 0.06 1.26
Share bullocks 0.28 2.37 –0.28 –2.08 –0.07 –0.78 0.02 0.33 –0.05 –0.54 0.10 0.33 –0.29 –1.38 0.23 1.58 –0.04 –0.55 0.06 0.47
Share donkeys 0.07 0.46 0.28 1.73 0.14 1.18 –0.03 –0.36 0.19 1.89 –0.35 –0.48 –0.21 –0.81 –0.28 –1.72 0.06 0.64 0.29 2.04
Share sheep and goats –0.20 –3.44 0.11 1.87 –0.05 –1.20 –0.02 –0.90 0.02 0.67 –0.24 –1.29 0.03 0.36 –0.11 –2.12 –0.05 –1.40 0.07 1.28
Unearned income
ln(total unearned income) –0.01 –1.74 –0.03 –6.03 –0.03 –8.25 –0.00 –1.07 –0.00 –1.73 –0.04 –2.93 –0.04 –6.13 –0.03 –5.75 0.00 1.40 –0.01 –1.43
Share rental income –0.05 –1.05 0.13 2.62 0.10 2.82 0.06 2.57 0.08 2.81 0.21 1.53 0.15 2.16 0.09 1.92 0.02 0.85 0.10 2.44




                                                            January interview                                                                                                                     September interview                                                              
Work on own farm Off-farm work Farm and off-farm Home activities Leisure and rest Work on own farm Off-farm work Farm and off-farm Home activities Leisure and rest
b
Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t-
efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic
Family background
ln(father's land) 0.03 1.96 –0.03 –1.45 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.20 –0.01 –0.73 –0.00 –0.07 –0.02 –0.84 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.35
ln(inherited acres) –0.00 –0.13 –0.03 –1.44 –0.02 –1.35 0.00 0.43 0.01 0.38 –0.03 –0.60 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.65 –0.00 –0.18 –0.04 –1.73
Education of head's
father –0.01 –0.71 0.03 1.58 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.14 –0.00 –0.04 –0.01 –0.37 –0.01 –0.57 –0.00 –0.41 –0.00 –0.06
Education of head's
mother 0.03 0.31 0.05 –0.61 –0.02 0.29 0.05 –1.36 –0.01 0.21 0.07 0.32 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.60 –0.03 –0.74 0.12 1.70
Year dummies
Year 3 0.12 4.61 –0.04 –1.44 0.03 1.73 0.04 2.87 –0.19 –10.92 0.34 3.37 0.57 12.59 0.01 0.38 0.64 24.60
Intercept –0.73 –1.02 –0.96 –1.24 –0.89 –1.66 0.26 0.74 –0.91 –1.89 –3.25 –1.64 –0.77 –0.66 –0.60 –0.86 0.28 0.66 –0.82 –1.18
Selection-term 0.42 0.48 0.35 0.23 0.32 0.56 0.61 0.32 0.28 0.43
Number of observations 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 571 1,335 665 1,335 1,335
of which, censored at 0 564 469 128 3 51 416 785 56 12 374
Chi-square of regression 773 408 707 1,500 966 210 509 412 1,041 1,127
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R-square 0.3404 0.1747 0.3738 1.0932 0.5438 0.2835 0.2225 0.4624 0.7213 0.4116
Testing household composition
                                                            January interview                                                                                                                     September interview                                                              
Work on own farm Off-farm work Farm and off-farm Home activities Leisure and rest Work on own farm Off-farm work Farm and off-farm Home activities Leisure and rest
F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p-
( ) statistic value statistic value statistic value statistic value statistic value statistic value statistic value statistic value statistic value statistic value
d
Daughter = daughter-
in-law 1 0.03 0.852 4.36 0.037 2.06 0.152 1.82 0.178 2.37 0.124 0.06 0.801 4.59 0.032 2.52 0.113 2.12 0.145 0.01 0.904
Daughter-in-law =
other female 2 0.06 0.971 7.26 0.027 6.32 0.042 2.55 0.279 7.59 0.022 1.79 0.409 7.73 0.021 5.05 0.080 4.32 0.115 0.08 0.962
c
All adult females same 3 0.27 0.849 2.52 0.056 2.44 0.063 1.28 0.278 2.64 0.048 0.60 0.618 2.69 0.045 2.02 0.110 1.47 0.221 0.14 0.606
All adult males same 3 0.81 0.487 5.08 0.002 3.52 0.015 17.29 0.000 3.36 0.018 0.43 0.733 0.29 0.831 0.67 0.570 9.15 0.000 0.61 0.606
All adults same 6 1.55 0.160 4.83 0.000 4.77 0.000 17.62 0.000 4.81 0.000 0.78 0.584 1.91 0.077 3.39 0.003 14.62 0.000 0.31 0.932
Note: t-statistics significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in boldface.
Omitted category is wife.  Other categories are thus compared to wives.
a
Complete data only available for year 3.
b
Chi-square test statistic reported instead of F statistic.
c
Number of tested parameter restrictions, i.e., degrees of freedom of the numerator.
d5
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Table 6—Tobit regression on total household time devoted to home activities
Dependent variable is the total time devoted to particular home activities by all household members (measured in days per year)
                                    Activities with male and female participation                                                                                Activities with exclusively female participation                                                 
Total home Collect Visit the Herd Milk Gather and Prepare Carry meals Cook and Knit and Prepare Wash and Clean the
activities Fetch water firewood market livestock animals prepare fodder dung cakes to workers wash dishes stitch ghee iron clothes house
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Household composition
1n(household size) 0.21 2.04 –0.46 –1.55 –0.05 –0.16 –0.04 –0.14 1.65 1.73 0.17 0.73 0.26 0.80 –0.03 –0.17 –0.89 –1.60 0.37 4.33 0.09 0.29 0.22 1.08 0.69 6.47 0.42 3.51
a
Share male head –0.76 –2.02 –7.56 –2.95 –2.76 –1.06 –4.90 –2.12 6.34 0.74 3.17 1.56 7.12 2.55 –0.84 –0.51 –10.72 –1.93 –0.48 –0.66 –5.64 –2.01 –1.16 –0.62 –1.44 –1.56 –0.36 –0.35
Share sons –0.83 –1.74 –2.24 –1.62 0.21 0.15 –2.31 –1.84 5.70 1.32 0.61 0.56 2.78 1.87 –1.04 –1.20 –3.08 –1.09 –0.68 –1.82 –2.18 –1.52 –0.98 –1.01 –1.43 –3.00 –1.03 –1.93
Share other males –1.00 –2.26 –2.47 –1.95 –0.94 –0.72 –0.60 –0.52 4.85 1.23 0.62 0.62 1.67 1.21 –0.52 –0.65 –5.51 –1.99 –0.67 –1.89 –2.48 –1.81 –1.11 –1.18 –1.46 –3.25 –1.04 –2.07
Share daughters –0.29 –0.60 –2.08 –1.43 1.57 1.11 –1.88 –1.49 1.22 0.28 –0.17 –0.16 4.42 2.98 1.17 1.38 –2.04 –0.73 –0.19 –0.51 1.72 1.19 –0.79 –0.82 –0.47 –0.98 –0.14 –0.27
Share daughters-in-law –0.04 –0.10 –1.02 –0.73 0.22 0.16 –2.41 –1.98 1.56 0.38 0.20 0.19 4.14 2.88 0.95 1.17 –1.51 –0.54 –0.26 –0.71 2.02 1.46 –0.33 –0.36 –0.89 –1.94 –0.38 –0.73
Share other females –0.35 –0.82 –2.18 –1.68 –0.02 –0.02 –2.99 –2.62 –1.09 –0.26 –0.13 –0.13 2.25 1.64 –0.10 –0.13 –3.04 –1.11 –0.03 –0.09 0.99 0.77 –0.89 –1.01 –0.38 –0.88 –0.47 –0.98
Share children –0.83 –1.93 –2.60 –2.07 –0.01 –0.01 –2.29 –2.01 2.01 0.51 0.36 0.37 1.97 1.47 –1.10 –1.40 –2.37 –0.89 –0.70 –2.05 –1.81 –1.38 –1.10 –1.23 –1.43 –3.29 –1.00 –2.06
Share young males –0.49 –1.13 –2.43 –1.92 0.11 0.09 –2.11 –1.85 4.19 1.05 0.55 0.56 3.29 2.45 –1.21 –1.55 –2.25 –0.85 –0.56 –1.66 –1.00 –0.78 –1.27 –1.44 –1.43 –3.32 –0.94 –1.95
Share young females  0.11  0.25 –0.56 –0.44 1.20 0.95 –1.37 –1.20 1.87 0.47 1.41 1.43 3.66 2.70 0.10 0.12 –1.37 –0.52 –0.19 –0.55 1.53 1.18 –0.39 –0.45 –0.56 –1.30 –0.26 –0.54
Human capital
Males
Average age –0.00 –0.42 –0.04 –1.35 –0.06 –2.06 –0.04 –1.34 0.10 1.11 0.05 2.12 0.03 0.94 0.01 0.58 –0.06 –1.12 0.00 0.41 –0.01 –0.45 0.01 0.38 –0.00 –0.11 0.01 1.22
Average squared age 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.94 0.00 1.59 0.00 1.15 –0.00 –1.07 –0.00 –2.15 –0.00 –1.13 –0.00 –0.52 0.00 0.68 –0.00 –0.11 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.25 –0.00 –1.30
Average education –0.02 –3.46 –0.09 –4.22 –0.05 –2.21 0.04 2.19 –0.27 –4.09 0.00 0.14 –0.04 –1.61 –0.00 –0.32 –0.13 –3.46 –0.01 –1.61 0.04 2.00 0.01 0.55 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.44
Average height 0.00 0.57 0.01 1.20 –0.01 –1.30 –0.00 –0.21 0.01 0.23 –0.00 –0.41 0.02 2.13 –0.00 –0.39 –0.00 –0.05 –0.00 –0.56 0.01 1.29 0.01 0.84 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.65
Females
Average age 0.00 0.03 –0.00 –0.03 –0.01 –0.25 –0.01 –0.46 –0.10 –1.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.05 2.81 –0.06 –1.00 –0.00 –0.38 –0.08 –2.43 –0.01 –0.68 0.00 0.24 –0.01 –0.80
Average squared age –0.00 –0.53 –0.00 –0.01 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.02 –0.00 –0.39 –0.00 –0.21 –0.00 –2.92  0.00  0.98 –0.00 –0.28 0.00 1.94 –0.00 –0.01 –0.00 –0.90 0.00 0.46
Average education –0.04 –2.64 –0.06 –1.40 –0.05 –1.04 –0.00 –0.09 –0.16 –1.19 –0.00 –0.04 –0.20 –4.27 –0.00 –0.17 –0.11 –1.24 –0.00 –0.08 0.07 1.82 –0.02 –0.60 –0.02 –1.16 –0.02 –1.38
Average height –0.01 –1.62 0.01 1.14 –0.01 –0.52 –0.00 –0.32 –0.01 –0.19 0.01 0.95 0.01 0.59 0.00 0.50 –0.01 –0.52 –0.00 –1.42 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.36 –0.00 –1.31 –0.01 –1.35
Assets
ln(owned land) 0.01  0.29 –0.19 –2.39 –0.12 –1.47 0.07 0.99 –0.52 –2.21 0.03 0.51 0.01 0.08 –0.12 –2.49 –0.29 –2.12 0.06 2.96 –0.08 –0.98 0.12 2.32 0.06 2.18 0.01 0.39
Share irrigated –0.12 –1.98 0.01 0.07 –0.32 –1.72 –0.07 –0.43 –0.41 –0.76 –0.01 –0.08 –0.06 –0.31 –0.16 –1.55 0.50 1.73 –0.15 –3.24 0.10 0.56 –0.16 –1.41 –0.10 –1.69 –0.05 –0.75
ln(value of  farm tools) 0.01 0.52 –0.02 –0.59 –0.02 –0.43 0.00 0.09 –0.21 –1.69 –0.03 –0.93 0.02 0.44 –0.00 –0.13 0.15 2.04 –0.00 –0.28 0.06 1.62 –0.00 –0.07 –0.01 –0.76 –0.01 –0.43
ln(number livestock) 0.24 7.94 0.22 2.55 0.26 2.84 0.09 1.17 1.66 6.04 0.98 13.43 1.11 11.30 0.76 13.66 0.66 4.16 0.01 0.26 –0.09 –1.03 0.83 12.47 0.04 1.31 –0.00 –0.01
Share buffalo 0.13 1.84 0.16 0.76 0.38 1.80 0.14 0.74 0.35 0.53 0.38 2.31 0.95 4.22 0.39 3.26 –0.22 –0.64 –0.07 –1.28 0.03 0.16 0.94 7.02 0.06 0.94 –0.00 –0.05
Share bullocks 0.24 1.24 –0.46 –0.85 0.51 0.91 0.01 0.03 0.42 0.25 –0.71 –1.61 0.20 0.33 –0.16 –0.50 1.25 1.51 0.14 0.97 0.28 0.55 0.26 0.77 0.69 3.79 0.53 2.60
Share donkeys 0.07 0.32 0.45 0.71 0.62 0.94 –0.55 –0.95 0.68 0.33 –0.58 –1.08 –0.40 –0.56 –1.19 –3.32 –0.66 –0.65 0.10 0.61 –0.43 –0.68 –0.25 –0.57 0.08 0.37 –0.02 –0.09
Share sheep and goats –0.07 –1.06 0.01 0.04 –0.25 –1.12 0.12 0.63 –0.51 –0.77 –0.66 –4.04 –0.89 –3.99 –0.89 –6.88 –0.83 –2.14 0.04 0.67 0.23 1.15 –1.15 –7.15 0.18 2.57 0.16 2.03
Unearned income
ln(total unearned income) –0.00 –0.14 –0.01 –0.59 –0.04 –2.23 0.01 0.39 –0.05 –0.87 –0.01 –0.50 0.02 1.10 –0.02 –1.79 –0.02 –0.88 –0.00 –0.97 –0.01 –0.33 –0.01 –0.74 –0.01 –0.98 0.00 0.81
Share rental income 0.05 0.80 0.38 2.04 0.13 0.68 0.09 0.58 0.20 0.34 0.10 0.72 –0.12 –0.64 0.03 0.35 –0.67 –2.16 0.09 2.07 0.13 0.82 0.10 0.90 0.10 1.74 0.01 0.15




                                    Activities with male and female participation                                                                                Activities with exclusively female participation                                                 
Total home Collect Visit the Herd Milk Gather and Prepare Carry meals Cook and Knit and Prepare Wash and Clean the
activities Fetch water firewood market livestock animals prepare fodder dung cakes to workers wash dishes stitch ghee iron clothes house
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Family background
ln(father's land) 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.12 0.08 1.16 –0.12 –1.97 0.57 2.97 0.03 0.53 0.01 0.12 –0.02 –0.54 0.16 1.32 –0.01 –0.48 –0.06 –0.79 –0.05 –1.03 –0.02 –0.67 –0.01 –0.22
ln(inherited acres) 0.02 0.51 0.05 0.51 0.06 0.74 0.13 1.72 0.09 –0.37 –0.01 –0.15 –0.11 –1.22 –0.02 –0.43 –0.11 –0.74 0.02 0.67 0.17 1.99 0.06 1.14 –0.00 –0.03 0.02 0.47
Education of head's
father 0.03 1.51 –0.09 –1.34 –0.05 –0.83 –0.06 –1.13 0.12 0.62 –0.01 –0.14 0.02 0.32 –0.11 –3.17 0.05 0.44 –0.00 –0.10 –0.01 –0.16 –0.01 –0.30 –0.01 –0.31 –0.04 –1.60
Education of head's
mother –0.01 –0.10 –0.27 –0.62 0.28 0.92 –0.03 –0.13 –2.17 –1.38 –0.17 –0.70 0.52 1.57 –0.00 –0.02 –0.55 –0.76 0.08 1.04 0.24 0.84 –0.20 –0.80 0.12 1.21 –0.06 –0.52
Year dummies
Year 2 (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 0.87 11.05 –0.82 –3.47 0.17 4.80 0.42 3.25 0.10 1.13 –0.14 –3.13 –0.27 –5.33
Year 3 0.37 4.59 –0.39 –1.68 –0.26 –7.21 –0.12 –0.88 0.08 0.91 –0.09 –1.90 –0.18 –3.55
Intercept 5.15 5.55 0.53 0.19 5.39 1.96 5.72 2.33 –5.85 –0.70 –2.59 –1.22 –7.99 –2.71 –1.11 –0.68 7.72 1.57 3.80 5.15 –1.22 –0.44 –1.17 –0.63 1.73 1.85 2.31 2.20
Selection-term 0.44 1.12 1.18 1.11 2.90 0.94 1.30 1.11 2.41 0.59 1.88 1.21 0.74 0.84
Number of observations 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003
of which, censored at 0 3 285 260 170 449 209 201 1,011 1,651 30 1,149 1,129 184 208
Chi-square of regression 495 569 445 260 286 335 470 1,005 408 437 306 977 696 330
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R-square 0.36 0.28 0.22 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.20 0.13 0.06
Testing household composition
F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p-
(4) stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value
Daughter-in-law 1 0.44 0.51 0.85 0.36 1.52 0.22 0.30 0.58 0.01 0.92 0.20 0.66 0.06 0.81 0.14 0.71 0.09 0.76 0.05 0.82 0.08 0.78 0.45 0.50 1.36 0.24 0.32 0.57
(3) Daughter-in-law =
other female 2 0.70 0.71 1.20 0.55 2.58 0.27 1.35 0.51 0.68 0.71 0.22 0.90 3.97 0.14 4.55 0.10 0.56 0.76 0.58 0.75 0.90 0.64 0.67 0.71 2.02 0.36 0.69 0.71
c
All adult females same 3 0.35 0.79 1.14 0.33 0.88 0.45 2.52 0.06 0.23 0.87 0.07 0.97 3.62 0.01 1.64 0.18 0.46 0.71 0.25 0.86 0.77 0.51 0.45 0.72 1.35 0.26 0.49 0.69
All adult males same 3 1.95 0.12 3.10 0.03 1.28 0.28 3.24 0.02 0.62 0.60 0.95 0.41 2.54 0.06 0.69 0.56 2.48 0.06 1.50 0.21 1.54 0.20 0.48 0.69 3.87 0.01 2.16 0.09
All adults same 6 1.62 0.14 1.83 0.09 1.88 0.08 2.18 0.04 1.25 0.28 0.84 0.54 2.98 0.01 2.53 0.02 1.97 0.07 1.70 0.12 4.92 0.00 0.39 0.88 3.74 0.00 1.68 0.12
Note: t-statistics significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in boldface.
Omitted category is wife.  Other categories are thus compared to wives.
a
Complete data only available for year 3.
b
Chi-square test statistic reported instead of F statistic.
c
Number of tested parameter restrictions, i.e., degrees of freedom of the numerator.
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Table 7—Tobit regression on total household time devoted to "market" activities
Dependent variable is the total time devoted to particular activities by all household members, based on a one-week recall interview
(measured in half-days per week).
                                                                      Farm                                                                                                                                       Nonfarm                                                                       
Construction and Government Private-sector Nonfarm
Work on own crops Livestock labor Farm supervision     field repair          Farm casual        employment        employment      self-employed Nonfarm casual    Total nonfarm  
   
Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t-
efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic
Household composition
1n(household size) 0.29 1.19 0.20 0.35 0.57 1.87 0.36 1.07 –0.18 –0.23 2.34 1.87 2.82 1.87 3.18 3.72 2.68 2.38 2.78 5.76
a
Share male head 0.04 0.02 2.57 0.54 1.01 0.39 1.86 0.63 3.15 0.46 –10.74 –1.05 11.93 0.89 –0.75 –0.10 4.22 0.42 4.27 1.03
Share sons 0.02 0.02 3.94 1.66 –0.70 –0.54 0.06 0.05 5.58 1.69 –2.99 –0.53 7.86 1.23 –5.46 –1.38 –0.80 –0.17 –1.23 –0.58
Share other males –0.72 –0.74 5.21 2.35 –0.71 –0.59 –0.65 –0.48 4.71 1.58 6.81 1.28 10.44 1.79 –2.78 –0.75 2.20 0.50 3.93 1.99
Share daughters 0.25 0.24 2.50 1.05 –0.63 –0.49 –0.02 –0.01 7.06 2.14 –5.19 –0.91 1.75 0.27 –0.95 –0.24 –0.36 –0.07 –2.14 –1.00
Share daughters-in-law –0.01 –0.01 2.30 1.01 –2.01 –1.59 1.34 0.95 –0.34 –0.11 3.54 0.65 9.43 1.58 –3.02 –0.81 –2.55 –0.56 –1.05 –0.51
Share other females –1.33 –1.41 0.07 0.03 –2.08 –1.77 –0.60 –0.45 4.19 1.34 –8.95 –1.78 4.54 0.77 –4.92 –1.38 –5.41 –1.19 –5.18 –2.71
Share children –1.15 –1.21 1.43 0.66 –1.52 –1.29 –0.34 –0.26 4.79 1.62 –6.04 –1.17 –0.34 –0.06 –5.07 –1.40 –7.52 –1.71 –3.62 –1.88
Share young males –0.39 –0.42 6.45 3.00 –0.75 –0.64 0.62 0.47 4.57 1.53 –7.24 –1.41 3.31 0.57 –6.62 –1.85 –3.17 –0.72 –3.30 –1.72
Share young females –0.86 –0.92 2.42 1.13 –1.58 –1.35 –0.65 –0.49 1.82 0.61 –4.95 –0.97 4.28 0.74 –5.81 –1.63 –3.14 –0.73 –3.38 –1.77
Human capital
Males
Average age –0.02 –0.91 0.03 0.63 0.01 0.48 –0.05 –1.85 –0.01 –0.16 0.11 0.89 0.07 0.53 –0.03 –0.38 –0.18 –1.84 0.02 0.36
Average squared age –0.00 –0.04 –0.00 –0.81 –0.00 –0.51 0.00 1.41 0.00 0.06 –0.00 –1.11 –0.00 –0.63 0.00 0.74 0.00 1.02 –0.00 –0.79
Average education –0.08 –5.23 –0.08 –2.34 –0.05 –2.54 –0.02 –1.13 –0.23 –4.26 0.69 8.44 –0.04 –0.47 0.19 3.67 –0.55 –7.11 0.11 3.84
Average height 0.01 1.10 0.02 1.31 0.00 0.33 0.01 0.97 0.03 1.50 0.09 2.16 –0.04 –1.07 –0.07 –2.59 –0.04 –1.47 –0.01 –0.64
Females
Average age 0.06 2.47 –0.05 –0.94 –0.01 –0.41 0.04 1.28 0.12 1.53 –0.13 –1.07 0.17 1.18 –0.07 –0.81 0.04 0.37 –0.04 –0.87
Average squared age –0.00 –2.78 0.00 1.24 0.00 0.48 –0.00 –1.55 –0.00 –1.46 0.00 1.49 –0.00 –1.69 0.00 0.49 –0.00 –0.67 0.00 0.67
Average education –0.09 –2.98 –0.09 –1.30 0.04 1.17 0.01 0.26 –0.18 –1.32 0.31 2.28 –0.29 –1.57 –0.39 –3.55 –0.38 –2.32 –0.13 –2.12
Average height –0.01 –0.68 –0.01 –0.44 0.01 1.50 –0.00 –0.29 –0.03 –1.09 0.02 0.43 –0.01 –0.25 –0.03 –0.97 0.05 1.63 0.01 0.44
Assets
ln(owned land) 0.11 1.95 0.13 0.97 0.06 0.89 –0.14 –1.79 –0.67 –3.56 1.01 3.32 –0.06 –0.17 –0.43 –2.03 –0.84 –3.05 –0.09 –0.78
Share irrigated 0.03 0.27 0.05 0.18 0.41 2.56 0.09 0.51 –1.52 –3.74 –1.22 –1.64 0.13 0.16 –0.10 –0.21 –0.74 –1.28 –0.60 –2.28
ln(value of  farm tools) 0.18 6.63 –0.06 –1.00 0.15 4.40 0.20 5.08 –0.10 –1.01 –0.51 –3.54 –0.46 –2.70 0.63 6.69 –0.35 –2.55 0.01 0.26
ln(number livestock) 0.87 13.82 1.60 11.09 0.51 6.43 0.56 6.31 0.13 0.62 –0.13 –0.38 –1.45 –3.89 –1.58 –6.99 –0.67 –2.42 –1.01 –8.01
Share buffalo 0.12 0.81 0.91 2.67 0.12 0.63 –0.14 –0.68 0.19 0.40 –1.45 –1.73 0.23 0.25 0.69 1.29 –0.42 –0.65 –0.28 –0.93
Share bullocks –0.48 –1.29 1.56 1.82 3.45 7.46 –0.70 –1.48 1.85 1.88 2.50 1.15 –1.41 –0.62 –0.19 –0.14 –1.88 –1.20 –0.87 –1.15
Share donkeys –0.19 –0.43 1.66 1.71 –0.16 –0.28 –1.24 –1.61 0.41 0.21 1.33 0.54 1.47 0.56 2.39 1.59 –1.24 –0.53 1.66 1.87
Share sheep and goats –0.69 –4.43 –0.53 –1.50 –0.27 –1.39 –0.82 –3.67 0.30 0.58 0.82 0.99 3.21 3.59 1.91 3.51 0.87 1.30 1.33 4.34
Unearned income
ln(total unearned income) –0.02 –1.43 –0.02 –0.93 –0.02 –1.42 –0.01 –0.53 –0.11 –2.76 –0.16 –2.57 –0.15 –2.11 –0.15 –3.65 –0.12 –2.36 –0.16 –6.70
Share rental income –0.75 –5.90 0.11 0.41 –0.13 –0.83 –0.05 –0.30 0.68 1.53 –0.10 –0.15 1.46 1.94 1.51 3.34 –0.56 –0.88 0.77 3.03




                                                                      Farm                                                                                                                                       Nonfarm                                                                       
Construction and Government Private-sector Nonfarm
Work on own crops Livestock labor Farm supervision     field repair          Farm casual        employment        employment      self-employed Nonfarm casual    Total nonfarm  
   
Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t- Co- t-
efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic
Family background
ln(father's land) 0.17 3.30 0.00 0.03 0.18 2.83 0.17 2.59 0.19 1.21 –0.30 –1.09 0.24 0.79 –0.79 –4.03 0.45 2.04 –0.05 –0.49
ln(inherited acres) –0.03 –0.53 –0.05 –0.33 –0.00 –0.03 –0.17 –2.00 –0.22 –1.04 –0.05 –0.17 –0.15 –0.41 0.21 0.89 –0.13 –0.42 –0.23 –1.81
Education of head's
father –0.07 –1.66 –0.24 –2.45 0.03 0.60 –0.11 –1.71 –0.28 –1.41 0.37 1.86 –0.37 –1.32 0.13 0.84 –0.70 –2.41 0.15 1.67
Education of head's
mother 0.25 1.14 –0.04 –0.07 0.10 0.36 0.52 1.73 –1.22 –0.88 0.99 1.11 2.45 2.16 0.15 0.20 0.74 0.55 0.06 0.15
Year dummies
Year 3 0.18 2.24 –0.48 –2.60 0.97 9.48 0.31 2.75 0.22 0.85 –0.51 –1.17 –0.45 –0.93 –0.02 –0.08 0.04 0.11 –0.22 –1.37
Intercept 0.49 0.24 –2.82 –0.60 –3.42 –1.33 –4.29 –1.52 –5.98 –0.90 –23.60 –2.05 –4.78 –0.38 10.79 1.43 7.07 0.76 2.27 0.55
Selection-term 1.61 3.41 1.99 1.86 3.33 5.94 6.90 4.88 5.11 3.19
Number of observations 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003 2,003
of which, censored at 0 378 827 496 1,119 1,565 1,606 1,609 1,293 1,515 612
Chi-square of regression 1,683 701 1,144 1,432 948 567 219 437 676 480
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R-square 0.196 0.086 0.136 0.238 0.237 0.141 0.056 0.073 0.146 0.055
Testing household composition
F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p- F p-
(4) stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value stat. value
Daughter = daughter-in-law 1 0.11 0.745 0.01 0.91 1.90 0.168 1.57 0.211 8.13 0.004 3.95 0.047 2.52 0.113 0.50 0.480 0.38 0.538 0.45 0.504
Daughter-in-law =other female 2 4.18 0.124 2.08 0.354 2.80 0.247 2.87 0.239 8.17 0.017 8.14 0.017 2.57 0.277 1.84 0.398 1.70 0.427 6.16 0.046
c
All adult females same 3 1.57 0.195 0.82 0.485 1.86 0.134 0.96 0.411 3.16 0.024 2.99 0.030 1.30 0.273 1.06 0.364 0.81 0.488 3.25 0.021
All adult males same 3 0.70 0.554 2.30 0.075 0.48 0.698 0.65 0.580 1.28 0.281 4.72 0.003 1.21 0.304 1.20 0.307 0.64 0.591 7.88 0.000
All adults same 6 2.48 0.022 1.73 0.109 1.47 0.186 1.31 0.27 1.85 0.086 3.52 0.002 1.32 0.244 0.86 0.523 0.82 0.557 6.06 0.000
Note: t-statistics significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in boldface.
Omitted category is wife.  Other categories are thus compared to wives.
a
Complete data only available for year 3.
b
Chi-square test statistic reported instead of F statistic.
c
Number of tested parameter restrictions, i.e., degrees of freedom of the numerator.
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Table 8—Specialization indices for farm and wage work
Complete Incomplete Number of households
specialization specialization in which activity
index index is undertaken
(percent)
Farmwork
Work on own crops 21.5 0.482 1,984
a
Construction and repairs of fields 48.1 0.696 988
a
Farm supervision 72.2 0.868 1,761
a
herding own livestock 64.7 0.809 1,463
a
Casual labor on others' farms 43.3 0.644 514
a
Nonfarmwork
Government employment 81.2 0.877 482
a
Private-sector employment 79.9 0.886 491
a
Self-employment 71.8 0.836 877
a
Nonfarm casual labor 65.7 0.799 596
a
Total nonfarm labor 56.7 0.747 1,709
a
Household chores
Fetching water 43.4 0.623 438
b
Collecting wood 58.2 0.758 467
b
Marketing 70.4 0.878 575
b
Herding 73.9 0.882 245
b
Milking 67.4 0.868 513
b
Collecting fodder 50.6 0.735 539
b
Making dung cakes 69.7 0.824 1,226
a
Taking meals to workers 85.8 0.915 422
a
Husking 72.5 0.835 171
a
Cooking 40.6 0.654 2,382
a
Knitting 75.6 0.860 1,030
a
Making ghee 95.0 0.972 1,015
a
Washing 53.7 0.724 2,208
a
Cleaning 53.1 0.723 2,177
a
Total household chores 5.9 0.461 767
a
January interview
Work on own farm 45.6 0.652 890
c
Work on others' farm 67.5 0.789 117
c
Work on own or others' farm 43.5 0.636 926
c
Nonfarmwork 59.9 0.753 1,035
c
Farm and nonfarmwork 38.1 0.574 1,434
c
Home tasks/marketing 7.7 0.298 1,6.11
c




Own farmwork 49.1 0.663 634
c
Work on others' farm 57.7 0.725 26
c
All farmwork 49.1 0.662 654
c
Nonfarmwork 59.6 0.746 644
c
All market work 39.2 0.589 1,000
c
Household tasks/marketing 16.3 0.375 1,556
c
Leisure 24.0 0.457 1,127
c
 Data available for three years.
a
 Data available for year 3 only
b
 Data available for years 2 and 3.
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Table 9—ML estimates of male and female time allocation
                                                            Farm                                       Nonfarm                                                                                                                                                Household chores                                                                                         
Nonfarm Gather and          Total home
Work on own crops   Farm casual        self-employed     Nonfarm  laborer      Total nonfarm     Fetch water        Collect firewood Visit the market Herd livestock Milk animals prepare fodder      activities      
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z
Human capital
Difference in age 0.01 8.05 0.00 1.85 0.01 3.71 –0.00 –0.31 0.00 3.11 –0.00 –1.52 0.01 3.08 0.01 4.59 –0.00 –0.27 0.02 6.32 0.01 3.72 0.00 1.82
Difference in education 0.01 1.46 –0.04 –2.86 0.04 4.21 –0.02 –1.05 0.05 12.16 –0.05 –3.93 0.01 0.88 0.04 3.91 0.01 0.35 -0.05 -3.31 –0.03 –2.63 –0.04 –5.94
Difference in height 0.02 35.51 0.02 9.03 0.03 13.05 0.04 11.33 0.03 28.29 -0.02 –5.90 0.01 3.51 0.02 6.27 0.02 3.34 0.02 3.51 0.02 9.06 0.00 0.12
Gender and social roles (coefficients reported in logs)
Wife 0.06 3.38 –0.12 –2.31 0.06 1.23 0.40 6.02 0.17 5.82 –0.78 –9.08 0.04 0.60 0.08 1.22 0.16 1.28 -0.62 –7.80 –0.28 –4.92 –0.42 –13.56
Daughter 0.39 14.67 0.08 1.04 –0.05 –0.71 0.29 3.24 0.22 4.96 –0.81 –7.35 0.15 1.59 0.46 4.67 0.71 4.01 0.16 1.61 0.21 2.67 –0.17 –3.81
Daughter-in-law 0.13 4.39 0.12 1.53 0.07 1.05 0.40 4.01 0.28 6.23 –1.32 –8.15 0.17 1.74 0.42 3.67 0.35 1.96 –0.57 –4.36 –0.20 –2.35 –0.57 –11.07
Other female 0.32 10.91 0.26 3.42 0.28 3.85 0.28 2.51 0.41 8.17 –0.62 –4.62 0.37 3.68 0.26 2.45 0.42 2.21 0.29 3.20 0.27 3.34 0.09 2.18
Son –0.50 –14.07 –0.15 –1.99 –0.24 –3.25 –0.98 –6.65 –0.80 –11.88 0.71 8.81 -0.30 –2.65 –0.90 -4.91 –1.56 –2.48 0.14 1.49 –0.01 –0.15 0.31 8.03
Other male –0.20 –5.85 0.07 0.91 0.15 2.08 –0.83 –5.14 –0.32 –5.62 0.62 6.00 –0.20 –1.50 –0.20 –1.60 –1.64 –2.30 0.41 3.66 0.21 2.23 0.41 8.46
Husband (a) df –0.65 –0.39 –0.45 –0.61 –0.59 0.33 –0.49 –1.26 –0.84 –0.33 –0.42 –0.04
Test husband =0 (b)  1 2,396 0.00 105 0.00 170 0.00              127 0.00           720 0.00 15.02 0.00 84.18 0.00 501.60 0.00 48.14 0.00 40.85 0.00 103.03 0.00 2.44 0.12
Distribution parameters
Ln(b) 1.49 77.71 1.14 22.29 0.76 14.40 1.10 16.17 1.00 31.41 1.48 23.63 0.99 14.44 0.76 9.63 0.84 6.03 0.76 10.23 0.82 14.85 1.47 50.44
Coefficient of house- 
      hold size in p –0.04 –7.94 –0.07 –4.91 –0.01 –0.95 0.03 1.71 –0.02 –2.95 0.05 3.42 –0.02 –1.22 –0.05 –2.35 –0.04 –1.19 –0.03 –1.33 –0.01 –0.43 –0.08 –4.96
Constant in p function 0.36 6.72 –0.32 –2.57 –1.92 –16.54 –1.97 –12.64 –1.26 –17.51 –1.23 –8.29 –1.14 –6.82 –1.35 –7.52 –1.97 –6.31 –1.38 –7.91 –0.88 –5.98 2.55 16.05
p at median household
      size 0.50 0.71 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.69 0.79 0.85 0.91 0.83 0.72 0.13
p at half median size 0.52 0.48 0.48 0.56 0.47 0.57 0.47 0.43 0.42 0.47 0.49 0.69
Number of observations 8,214 1,849 3,898 2,098 7,143 1,290 1,367 1,654 785 1,467 1,537 2,086
Log-likelihood –5,512 –1,666 –2,836 –1,496 –5,344 –1,026 –1,242 –1,179 –505 –1,372 –1,587 –421
Testing Equal Allocation
Human capital df Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value
all jointly 3 4,051.0 0.00 141.3 0.00 488.6 0.00 145.1 0.00 2,774.7 0.00 265.6 0.00 33.4 0.00 266.6 0.00 12.7 0.01 122.2 0.00 414.8 0.00 49.7 0.00
Gender
husband=wife 1 698.9 0.00 16.4 0.00 61.8 0.00 77.5 0.00 305.3 0.00 77.7 0.00 33.6 0.00 116.1 0.00 24.2 0.00 13.9 0.00 4.7 0.03 117.5 0.00
son=daughter 1 342.0 0.00 4.1 0.04 3.3 0.07 56.1 0.00 158.8 0.00 118.6 0.00 8.3 0.00 33.9 0.00 10.3 0.00 0.00 0.91 3.2 0.07 59.6 0.00
other males=other
female 1 103.7 0.00 2.3 0.13 1.2 0.27 27.3 0.00 69.9 0.00 39.9 0.00 9.2 0.00 6.6 0.01 7.2 0.01 0.5 0.48 0.2 0.70 18.2 0.00
Roles among females
wife=daughter 1 77.4 0.00 4.3 0.04 1.5 0.22 1.0 0.33 1.0 0.31 0.1 0.77 0.9 0.35 7.2 0.01 5.2 0.02 36.7 0.00 23.4 0.00 20.7 0.00
wife=daughter-
in-law 1 2.9 0.09 5.8 0.02 0.0 0.88 0.0 0.98 3.9 0.05 13.6 0.00 1.2 0.28 5.4 0.02 0.7 0.40 0.1 0.73 0.5 0.48 7.5 0.01
wife=other female 1 46.4 0.00 14.6 0.00 5.9 0.02 0.8 0.36 15.5 0.00 1.7 0.20 6.6 0.01 2.0 0.16 1.2 0.27 51.6 0.00 27.1 0.00 96.2 0.00
daughter=d-in-law1 35.7 0.00 0.1 0.76 1.3 0.25 0.6 0.44 0.6 0.43 9.9 0.00 0.0 0.89 0.1 0.80 1.6 0.21 18.0 0.00 10.7 0.00 33.5 0.00
all females 3 102.0 0.00 17.6 0.00 8.7 0.03 1.6 0.66 17.6 0.00 17.6 0.00 7.0 0.07 10.3 0.02 5.8 0.12 70.8 0.00 42.1 0.00 129.3 0.00
Roles among males
husband=son 1 15.3 0.00 6.5 0.01 5.9 0.02 10.3 0.00 11.8 0.00 8.6 0.00 2.1 0.15 3.2 0.07 3.4 0.07 13.6 0.00 15.0 0.00 45.7 0.00
husband=other 
males 1 103.6 0.00 17.4 0.00 31.1 0.00 2.3 0.13 17.5 0.00 3.7 0.05 2.9 0.09 28.0 0.00 3.2 0.08 17.9 0.00 19.7 0.00 42.4 0.00
all males 2 120.4 0.00 24.3 0.00 37.9 0.00 11.3 0.00 30.8 0.00 11.3 0.00 5.1 0.08 31.6 0.00 5.6 0.06 36.7 0.00 39.2 0.00 94.6 0.00
Roles and gender
all coefficients 6 6,536.2 0.00 159.4 0.00 282.3 0.00 1,026.8 0.00 3,045.9 0.00 253.0 0.00 184.0 0.00 1,947.6 0.00 870.4 0.00 278.2 0.00 221.6 0.00 515.5 0.00
Coefficients (in levels)
Wife 1.07 0.88 1.06 1.50 1.18 0.46 1.04 1.09 1.17 0.54 0.76 0.66
Daughter 1.47 1.08 0.95 1.33 1.25 0.44 1.16 1.58 2.04 1.18 1.24 0.84
Daughter in law 1.14 1.12 1.07 1.50 1.33 0.27 1.18 1.52 1.42 0.57 0.81 0.56
Other female 1.38 1.30 1.33 1.32 1.51 0.54 1.45 1.30 1.53 1.34 1.31 1.10
Son 0.60 0.86 0.78 0.37 0.45 2.03 0.74 0.41 0.21 1.15 0.99 1.37
Other male 0.82 1.08 1.17 0.44 0.73 1.86 0.82 0.82 0.19 1.50 1.24 1.51
Husband 0.52 0.68 0.64 0.54 0.55 1.40 0.61 0.29 0.43 0.72 0.66 0.96
Notes: Estimator is maximum likelihood. Likelihood function presented in the text.  One observation per household is omitted. Dependent variable is the share of a particular activity undertaken by individual household member.  t-statistics significant at the 10 percent level or
better appear in boldface.
(a) Coefficient of husband is implied by the other coefficients.
(b) Chi-square test of whether the log of implicit coefficient of husband is different from 0, i.e., whether the implicit coefficient is 1.62
Table 10—ML estimates of male participation in exclusively male activities
Livestock labor Construction and field repair Farm supervision
df coefficient z coefficient z coefficient z
Human capital
Difference in age 0.00 2.59 0.01 3.09 0.01 10.00
Difference in education –0.05 –7.12 –0.01 –1.46 –0.01 –2.62
Difference in height 0.01 4.21 0.02 6.36 0.01 5.06
Gender and social roles (coefficients
reported in logs)
Son –0.18 –2.23 –0.22 –3.06 0.16 3.32
Other male 0.41 8.55 0.41 10.07 0.38 10.14
Husband –0.41 –0.39 –0.99
a
Test husband = 0 1 113.13 0.00 129.81 0.00 540.96 0.00
b
Distribution parameters
Ln (b) 0.62 13.55 1.30 30.24 0.71 15.15
Coefficient of household size in p –0.21 –9.57 0.03 1.28 –0.10 –5.20
Constant in p function –0.06 –0.47 –0.06 –0.48 –0.73 –6.70
p at median household size 0.75 0.48 0.78
p at half median size 0.64 0.50 0.73
Number of observations 2,955 1,635 3,130
Log-likelihood –2,704 –1,480 –2,481
Testing equal allocation
df Chi-square p-value Chi-square p-value Chi-square p-value
Human capital
All jointly 3 100.90 0.0000 72.28 0.0000 168.79 0.0000
Roles among males
Husband = son 1 4.89 0.0271 3.81 0.0510 140.09 0.0000
Husband = other males 1 91.95 0.0000 113.58 0.0000 271.43 0.0000
All males 1 126.20 0.0000 144.92 0.0000 551.40 0.0000
Coefficients (in levels)
Son 0.83 0.81 1.17
Other male 1.50 1.51 1.46
Husband 0.66 0.68 0.37
Notes: Estimator is maximum likelihood. Likelihood function is presented in the text. One observation
per household is omitted. dependent variable is the share of a particular activity undertaken by an
individual household member.  t-statistics are significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in
boldface.
Coefficient of husband is implied by the other coefficients.
a
  Chi-square test of whether the log of implicit coefficient of the husband is different from 0, i.e., whether 
b
the implicit coefficient is 1.  6
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Table 11—ML estimates of participation in exclusively female household activities (see text for explanation)
Prepare Carry meals Cook and Knit and Prepare Wash and Clean the
   dung cakes       to workers       wash dishes           stitch                 ghee           iron clothes           house        
Co- Z- Co- Z- Co- Z- Co- Z- Co- Z- Co- Z- Co- Z-
df efficient score efficient score efficient score efficient score efficient score efficient score efficient score
Human capital
Difference in age –0.00 –0.48 0.01 1.76 –0.00 –2.29 –0.01 –4.07 0.01 6.27 –0.01 –5.58 –0.01 –11.14
Difference in education –0.07 –5.16 –0.03 –0.78 –0.02 –2.35 0.02 1.27 –0.02 –1.25 –0.03 –3.01 –0.02 –2.20
Difference in height 0.03 9.34 0.00 0.59 0.03 15.01 0.03 7.07 0.02 4.87 0.03 14.78 0.02 8.07
Gender and social roles (coefficients reported in logs)
Daughter –0.06 –0.91 0.06 0.47 0.08 2.22 –0.07 –0.96 0.47 6.37 –0.09 –2.00 –0.11 –2.40
Daughter-in-law –0.14 –2.15 0.35 3.00 –0.42 –9.56 –0.11 –1.57 –0.01 –0.17 –0.29 –6.69 –0.21 –4.82
Other female 0.36 6.35 0.02 0.15 0.41 14.03 0.13 1.72 –0.05 –0.49 0.39 11.58 0.25 6.70
Wife –0.28 –0.70 –0.29 0.04 –0.76 –0.15 0.01
a
Test wife = 0  1 48.98 0.00 54.74 0.00 168.32 0.00 0.64 0.42 130.84 0.00 34.73 0.00 0.03 0.85
b
Distribution parameters
ln(b) 1.14 19.88 1.13 7.45 1.24 43.86 1.06 15.92 0.73 4.69 1.33 39.56 1.25 35.34
Coefficient of household size in p 0.07 2.71 –0.01 –0.17 –0.04 –2.46 –0.01 –0.34 0.11 2.18 0.04 2.13 –0.05 –2.90
Constant in p function –1.52 –11.26 –2.06 –5.85 0.45 5.14 –1.42 –8.96 –3.83 –12.16 –0.49 –5.52 –0.24 –2.61
p at median household size 0.78 0.89 0.43 0.81 0.97 0.59 0.61
p at half median size 0.55 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.70 0.51 0.49
Number of observations 1,952 641 3,460 1,782 1,736 3,298 3,247
Log-likelihood –1,901 –524 –2,956 –1,675 –1,052 –3,159 3,158
Testing Equal Allocation
df Chi- p- Chi- p- Chi- p- Chi- p- Chi- p- Chi- p- Chi- p-
Human capital square value square value square value square value square value square value square value
all jointly 3 135.51 0.00 6.15 0.10 240.09 0.00 58.79 0.00 84.11 0.00 225.90 0.00 161.38 0.00
Roles among females
Wife = daughter 1 5.85 0.02 12.18 0.00 53.71 0.00 1.39 0.24 59.22 0.00 1.22 0.27 4.18 0.04
Wife = daughter-in-law 1 2.97 0.08 21.84 0.00 7.20 0.01 2.73 0.10 27.05 0.00 7.86 0.01 15.75 0.00
Wife = other female 1 47.11 0.00 10.03 0.00 199.02 0.00 0.73 0.39 24.86 0.00 97.68 0.00 19.62 0.00
Daughter = daughter-in-law 1 0.52 0.47 1.73 0.19 62.81 0.00 0.10 0.75 12.90 0.00 8.90 0.00 2.05 0.15
All females 3 60.53 0.00 54.78 0.00 307.59 0.00 4.83 0.18 134.19 0.00 118.43 0.00 46.17 0.00
Coefficients (in levels)
Daughter 0.94 1.07 1.08 0.93 1.59 0.92 0.90
Daughter-in-law 0.87 1.41 0.66 0.90 0.99 0.75 0.81
Other female 1.44 1.02 1.51 1.13 0.95 1.47 1.28
Wife 0.75 0.50 0.75 1.04 0.47 0.86 1.01
Notes: Estimator is maximum likelihood.  Likelihood function is presented in the text.  One observation per household is omitted.  Dependent variable is the share of a 
particular activity undertaken by individual household member.  t-statistics that are significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in boldface. 
 Coefficient of husband is implied by the other coefficients. 
a
 Chi-square test of whether the log of implicit coefficient of husband is different from 0, i.e., whether the implicit coefficient is 1.
b6
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Table 12—ML estimates of male and female time allocation in general (see text for explanation.)
                                                            January interview                                                                                                                     September interview                                                              
Worked on Farm and Leisure and Worked on Farm and Leisure and 
     own farm      Nonfarm work nonfarm work Household tasks     social time          own farm        Nonfarm work     nonfarm work   Household tasks     social time     
Co- z- Co- z- Co- z- Co- z- Co- z- Co- z- Co- z- Co- z- Co- z- Co- z-
df efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic efficient statistic
Human capital
Difference in age 0.01 3.70 0.01 2.28 0.01 6.22 0.00 2.11 0.01 10.97 0.01 6.17 0.00 1.74 0.01 6.98 0.00 1.80 0.01 8.84
Difference in education –0.01 –0.83 0.06 8.11 0.04 8.36 –0.04 –2.91 0.04 10.64 0.00 0.34 0.06 6.91 0.05 7.09 –0.04 –10.60 0.04 8.64
Difference in height 0.02 17.45 0.03 16.38 0.02 21.47 –0.01 –1.46 –0.01 -9.09 0.02 8.74 0.03 16.49 0.02 17.38 –0.01 -15.27 -0.01 -5.05
Gender and social roles (coefficients reported in logs)
Wife 0.19 4.04 0.14 3.12 0.14 4.26 –0.47 –31.60 0.17 7.07 –0.02 –0.39 0.02 0.33 –0.00 –0.13 –0.53         (1) 0.09 2.93
Daughter 0.40 6.30 0.36 5.61 0.32 7.14 –0.38         (3) 0.26 7.95 0.19 2.77 0.26 3.18 0.23 4.54 –0.53 –16.67 0.44 10.99  
Daughter in law 0.44 7.01 0.35 5.53 0.37 8.17 –0.49 –16.23 0.56 16.00 0.25 3.76 0.48 6.31 0.35 7.19 –0.63 –23.00 0.47 11.37
Other female 0.43 6.45 0.47 6.66 0.42 9.16 –0.22 –4.53 –0.07 –1.95 0.24 3.39 0.43 4.96 0.32 6.04 –0.33 –11.93 0.08 1.66
Son –1.25 –9.03 –1.27 -8.55 –1.05 –14.27 0.41         (3) –0.65 –15.32 –0.39 -4.67 –1.04 –8.95 –0.70 –10.56 0.50 21.19 –0.87 –13.64
Other male  –0.72 –7.32 –0.56 –6.28 –0.52 –9.42 0.47         (3) –0.53 –12.24 –0.02 –0.19 –0.50 –4.84 –0.21 –3.55 0.52 18.67 –0.51 –9.22
Husband (1) –0.86 –0.62 –0.55 0.17 –0.30 –0.54 –0.54 –0.44 0.21 –0.41
Test husband=0 (2) 1 701.47 0.00 334.30 0.00 781.96 0.00 13.10 0.00 320.52 0.00 273.01 0.00 162.60 0.00 356.18 0.00 152.96 0.00 349.54 0.00
Distribution parameters
In(b) 1.25 31.72 1.10 23.67 1.52 51.90 2.37 119.80 1.92 83.44 1.21 24.94 1.18 20.79 1.37 39.34 2.42 109.67 1.78 64.69
Coefficient of household
size in p –0.01 –1.34 0.00 0.23 –0.00 –0.33 0.02 2.43 0.03 4.18 –0.02 –1.53 –0.00 –0.16 –0.02 –2.22 0.01 1.22 0.06 7.10
Constant in p function –0.90 –9.81 –1.66 –16.30 –0.66 –9.38 0.74 10.61 –0.22 –3.42 –0.76 –6.73 –1.56 –11.91 –0.47 –5.48 0.92 11.27 –0.53 –6.66
p at median household size 0.73 0.84 0.66 0.29 0.50 0.71 0.83 0.65 0.27 0.52
p at half medium size 0.72 0.84 0.66 0.31 0.53 0.70 0.83 0.63 0.28 0.58
Number of observations 3,631 4,156 5,509 6,139 6,004 2,171 2,629 3,580 4,753 4,156
Log-likelihood –2,864 –2,956 –4,189 –701 –3,350 –2,004 –1,964 –3,153 –458 –2,703
Testing equal allocation
Human capital df Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value Chi-sq. p-value
All jointly 3 753.8 0.000 692.5 0.0001,133.8 0.000 482.1 0.000 183.2 0.000 190.8 0.000 759.1 0.000 745.8 0.0001,738.2 0.000 108.3 0.000
Gender
Husband=wife 1 174.8 0.000 119.0 0.000 225.7 0.000 128.4 0.000 205.3 0.000 62.9 0.000 52.5 0.000 87.5 0.000 1158.6 0.000 136.9 0.000
Son=daughter 1 102.2 0.000 102.3 0.000 227.7 0.000        (4) 259.8 0.000 24.6 0.000 81.2 0.000 108.4 0.000 1000.6 0.000 250.6 0.000
Oth.males=oth.fem. 1 75.1 0.000 64.2 0.000 136.4 0.000 194.8 0.000 60.0 0.000 4.5 0.035 36.9 0.000 35.0 0.000 475.0 0.000 60.4 0.000
Roles among females
Wife=daughter 1 5.5 0.019 6.9 0.009 9.1 0.003 42.1 0.000 3.9 0.050 5.2 0.022 5.5 0.019 12.0 0.001 0.0 0.876 39.1 0.000
Wife=d-in-law 1 8.1 0.005 6.6 0.010 14.9 0.000 0.3 0.558 64.9 0.000 9.4 0.002 20.6 0.000 29.4 0.000 13.3 0.000 43.2 0.000
Wife=other female 1 6.9 0.009 13.9 0.000 22.1 0.000 20.2 0.000 27.3 0.000 8.1 0.005 13.9 0.000 22.0 0.000 49.8 0.000 0.1 0.798
Daughter=d-in-law 1 0.2 0.696 0.0 0.933 0.5 0.465 15.3 0.000 29.8 0.000 0.3 0.562 3.0 0.084 2.3 0.132 6.1 0.013 0.2 0.632
All females 3 13.0 0.005 20.7 0.000 32.0 0.000 113.7 0.000 114.7 0.000 15.0 0.002 30.2 0.000 42.9 0.000 67.2 0.000 72.7 0.000
Roles among males
Husband=son 1 14.6 0.000 40.3 0.000 89.5 0.000 43.1 0.000 99.0 0.000 3.0 0.085 30.2 0.000 20.4 0.000 78.9 0.000 85.6 0.000
Husband=other males 1 1.8 0.180 0.4 0.529 0.4 0.549 69.0 0.000 31.0 0.000 22.8 0.000 0.1 0.706 11.1 0.001 71.9 0.000 3.2 0.074
All males 2 18.3 0.000 41.9 0.000 93.7 0.000        (4) 109.5 0.000 27.4 0.000 34.7 0.000 34.4 0.000 208.1 0.000 85.7 0.000
Roles and gender
All coefficients 65,617.8 0.0002,762.6 0.0005,551.6 0.0001,832.4 0.0002,952.5 0.000 517.0 0.000 1203.3 0.000 1423.4 0.0003,453.7 0.0002,798.5 0.000
Coefficients (in levels)
Wife                1.21 1.15 1.14 0.62 1.19 0.98 1.02 1.00 0.59 1.10
Daughter 1.49 1.44 1.37 0.69 1.29 1.21 1.30 1.26 0.59 1.55
Daughter-in-law 1.56 1.42 1.44 0.61 1.75 1.29 1.61 1.42 0.54 1.60
Other female 1.54 1.60 1.52 0.80 0.93 1.27 1.53 1.37 0.72 1.08
Son 0.29 0.28 0.35 1.51 0.52 0.68 0.35 0.50 1.65 0.42
Other male  0.48 0.57 0.60 1.59 0.59 0.98 0.60 0.81 1.68 0.60
Husband 0.42 0.54 0.58 1.18 0.74 0.58 0.58 0.64 1.23 0.66
Notes: Estimator is maximum likelihood.  Likelihood function presented in the text.  One observation per household is omitted.  Dependent variable is the share of a particular activity undertaken by individual
household member.  t-statistics significant at the 10 percent level or better appear in boldface.  (1) Coefficient of husband is implied by the other coefficients.  (2) Chi-square test of whether the log of implicit
coefficient of husband is different from 0, i.e., whether the implicit coefficient is 1.  (3) Standard error numerically undistinguishable from 0.  (4) Test not performed because standard error could not be
computed; see (3).65
Table 13—Extent of specialization by gender and race
Number of activities Number of activities
in which member for which member is
   Days per year            is involved         is solely responsible Number of
a              b            b
Mean  Median Mean Median Mean Median observations
Male head 295 257 6.1 6 3.0 2 789
Adult sons 174 103 3.1 2 0.5 0 956
Other adult males 192 77 2.7 2 0.5 0 411
Young males 115 0 1.1 0 0.2 0 940
Wife 237 228 4.3 4 2.1 1 756
Adult daughters 164 132 3.3 3 1.0 0 282
Daughters-in-law 166 140 3.2 3 0.8 0 549
Other adult females 105 17 2.2 1 0.6 0 375
Young females 74 0 1.7 0 0.3 0 821
Kids 1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 1,705
Notes: Number of observations refers to people reporting activities and days.  Data are for year 3. Adult
refers to 16 years of age and above; young refers to 7 to 15 years of age; kids are 6 years old and
below.
We assume people work 6 days a week, 6 hours per day. Farm supervision time is not included to avoid
a
double counting with farming itself.
Farm supervision is counted as a separate activity.
b66
Table 14—Activity switching over time
Percent doing task in task in year 2 Number of autocor.
performing  Correlation year 2 done not done in observations coefficient
task in year 1 coefficient in year 1 year 1 pairs rho
Percent not Percent doing Estimated
d
Farm work
Kharif land preparation 27.2 0.59 37.2 13.7 4,171 0.15
Kharif irrigation labor 30.8 0.66 36.9 11.6 3,359 0.26
Kharif harvesting labor 33.4 0.68 32.5 14.5 5,038 0.20
Rabi land preparation 28.2 0.64 30.6 14.9 5,124 0.16
Rabi irrigation labor 30.4 0.70 32.7 8.9 3,147 0.29
Rabi harvesting labor 36.4 0.61 33.5 16.0 5,072 0.26
Total crop labor 46.6 0.77 22.9 17.7 7,886 0.41
Farm supervision 37.6 0.81 21.1 14.0 3,419 0.23
a
Construction and field repairs 54.6 0.79 17.9 20.3 1,401 0.37
a
Livestock labor 38.0 0.68 31.5 13.7 2,701 0.48
a
Working as hired farm laborer 35.2 0.51 34.2 20.9 1,188 0.26
Nonfarm work
Government employment 16.5 0.92 8.7 2.4 1,948 0.60
Private-sector employment 19.0 0.79 21.9 4.6 1,129 0.58
Self-employment 19.7 0.76 25.4 6.6 2,824 0.53
Nonfarm casual labor 24.6 0.70 31.2 8.6 1,407 0.48
Total nonfarm labor 24.7 0.78 22.5 9.4 6,421 0.47
Household chores
b
Making dung cakes 43.2 0.29 41.0 39.4 1,694 0.10
Taking meals to workers 44.8 0.48 35.6 22.7 232 0.27
Husking 50.0 0.36 40.0 32.3 130
c
Cooking 69.0 0.57 19.7 48.3 3,730 0.20
Knitting 37.9 0.29 46.0 29.1 1,096 0.12
Making ghee 33.1 0.54 28.7 17.4 1,128 0.33
Washing and ironing clothes 55.4 0.46 28.3 40.1 3,136 0.18
Cleaning the house 54.5 0.39 34.4 43.0 3,051 0.12
  Males only.
a
  Females only.
b
  Not enough observations.
c
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